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Introduction

During the early 1930's, western Europe lay under the shadows of
economic dislocation, and the rise of German nationalismbrought new problems of security to Europe.

These two issues

The resultant insecurity

manifested itself in an increase of armaments and attempts to compromise
democratic faiths and ideas by appealing for stronger central governments.
Economic disruption had the effect of forcing governments to enter into
the economic life of their peoples by increasing the powers of the state.
The rise of German nationalism with its avowed aim.of destroying the
Versailles settlement added to this general feeling of insecurity.

The

faith in democratic ideas and practices was weakened by the inability of
the western democracies to deal with these problems.
Political factions of both the extreme right and left gained strength
from the economic and political weaknesses of the democracies.

In France

these weaknesses contributed to the growth of such extreme right wing
organizations as the Croix de Feu and the Action Français.

The leftist

forces combined against this common danger by creating the Popular Front^
a coalition of Socialists, Radical Socialists and Communists headed by the
Socialist Leon Blum.^

The Popular Front won the election of April 1936,

and its leader, Blum, became premier.

But the financial difficulties and

the internal divisions of the French people continued to worsen and, as a
consequence, weakened French foreign policy.

^Leon Blum.
(1 87 2 -I9 5 0 ). First Socialist premier of France.
Premier, June 1936 to June 1937*

2
In March 1936, Hitler's reoecupatlon of the Rhineland greatly inten
sified the French feeling of insecurity.

To deal with this new German

threat the French attempted to strengthen their security system by wooing
Mussolini into an anti-German front and by negotiating an alliance with
the Soviet Union.

Both attempts ultimately ended in failure.

In the

final analysis French security depended upon the policy of Great Britain.
The British prime minister, Stanley Baldwin,

2

maintained the tradi

tional British foreign policy of avoiding European entanglements.

He was

against any type of collective security such as the League of Nations and
binding military agreements.

Because of its grave financial, military and

political problems, Britain was inclined, to pursue a cautious policy of
indecision, ineptitude and watchful waiting.

The British government pre

ferred to maintain the post-war status-quo established by the Versailles
settlement and the Locarno agreements.

Any British efforts to pursue a

conciliatory attitude towards Italy in support of the French policy would
only be in reaction to a continuance of German military adventurism.
Although Germany was in danger of becoming isolated in the thirties,
Italian agression in Ethiopia and the implementation of sanctions against
Italy by the League soon changed the situation to Germany's favor.

The

possibility of Italy associating itself with France and Britain was out
of the question because of the application of the economic sanctions.
By its own actions in Ethiopia and later in Spain, Italy estranged itself
from Britain and France and moved steadily towards Germany.

^Stanley Baldwin. (1867-1950).
1923-1924; 1924 -1929 ; 1935 -1937 .

British statesman.

Prime minister,

3
The aim of German foreign policy since 1933 had been the destruction
of the Versailles settlement.

In addition. Hitler was constantly preaching

to Europe the danger of Communism.

Hitler’s anti-Communist policy was a

convenient smoke-screen behind which Hitler could operate with a more
realistic and pragmatic attitude concerning Germany's interests, while
at the same time allaying many of the apprehensions of conservative
circles in France and Britain over German aggressiveness.

The turning

point in German foreign policy came in 1936 when once having put aside
the Versailles question, Germany turned her attention upon the goals
Hitler had decided upon as early as 1923 while writing Mein Kampf.
Forced to emerge from Its diplomatic isolation by the menace of
Nazi Germany, Russia proceeded to follow a tactical policy of cooperation
with the western democracies.

This policy revealed itself in 193^ and

1935 when Russia joined the League of Nations and concluded mutual
assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia.

In 193^, the Comintern

instructed all foreign Communist parties to cooperate with political groups
opposed to Fascism.

This was particularly evident in the formation of

the French Popular Front.
While the major European powers concerned themselves with economic
problems and international affairs, Spain in the thirties suffered from
political, economic and social hardships resulting from.attempts by
Spanish liberals to implement democracy in Spain.

King Alfonso XIII^

was forced to flee Spain in April 1931. because of anti-monarchial election
returns.

The Spanish Liberals established a republic in place of the

3_.
'King Alfonso XIII. (1866-19^1)•

Bourbon king of Spain, 1902-1931

k
monarchy.

k

New elections for the Spanish parliament or Cortes resulted in

a left-republican victory.
The leftist majority in the Cortes immediately set out to enact
a radical legislative program which resulted in alienating the strongest,
wealthiest and most influential elements of the Spanish society.
was done with much rapidity but little foresight.

This

In the space of two

years, the Cortes estranged itself from the large landowners by instigating
a thorough land reform, from the Church by placing education in secular
hands and from the army by attempting to reform the obsolete officer
The reforms were needed and demanded by the working classes, but

Corp.

the celerity and method of carrying them out alarmed the vested interests
against which they were directed.
In 1 9 3 3 > the reaction to these reforms produced a swing to the right.
A conservative coalition was formed under the leadership of Gil Robles^
and Alejandro Lerroux.^

As might be expected, the conservative government

set out to annul or repress the reforms of the leftist parties.

The land,

educational and army reforms were either, repealed or allowed to fall by
the wayside for lack of administrative funds.
4

In 1 9 3 0 , Alfonso XIII appointed General Berenguer as prime minister
to replace General Primo de Rivera who had been forced to resign. This
change of ministers did not help to solve the acute economic problems of
Spain. The depression became worse and strikes increased in violence.
Martial law was proclaimed. Popular pressure forced Alfonso to announce
the restoration of the constitution that had been suspended since 1923 .
and to set a date for elections to the Cortes. The April 12, 1931 elections
resulted in a republican victory. Alfonso fled the country without
abdicating.
^Gil Robles.

(1 8 9 8 -).

Leader of the Spanish Catholic Party, CEDA.

^Alejandro Lerroux.
(l86l-19^9)
Leader of the Spanish Radical
Party. Foreign Minister of the Republic, 1931-

5
Political parties of loth the right and the left began to prepare
for the February 1936 elections.

The leftist parties, including the

Communists, allied with the moderate republicans to form a coalition com
monly referred to as the Popular Front.^

The rightist parties, although

not as well organized as those of the left, still maintained a common
front against the leftist reforms.

The conservative parties had two

things in common, fear of the working classes and the protection of their
vested interests. But within this common front there were many divergent
groups with different goals and aims.

The Traditionalists and the

Monarchists favored a return of the monarchy, preferably from the Bourbon
line.

The Catholic action groups were willing to cooperate with parlia

mentary government but demanded that the interests of the church be
protected.

The Falangist party, led by José Primo de Rivera,^ was a

Fascist group along the lines of Italian Fascism.

The Carlists advocated

strong nationalism and a corporate socialism.
On the eve of the February elections, another Spanish organization
was watching the developments with apprehension.
unique institution of the Spanish army.

In recent times the army had been

the final arbiter of Spanish political disputes.
in Spain in 1936 was no exception.

This was the curious and

The situation prevailing

The army was more of an instrument of

internal policy than a defender of national security.

The army reforms

enacted by the leftist government had been particularly irritating to this
7

The Anarchists, who controlled the third largest trade union in
Spain, refused to join.
8
,
José Primo de Rivera. (1903-1936). Founder and leader of the
Spanish Iklange or Fascist party. Executed by the Republicans.

6
glorified officers' club whose ratio of one officer to every six men was
three times greater than the French army ratio.

9

Every year, thirty

percent of the entire national budget was devoted to this inefficient
10
organization.

11

^

By 1936, the army leaders. General Francisco Franco

included, had decided to intervene in the political affairs of Spain if
the election returned the leftist parties to power.
'The February elections resulted in a victory for the Popular Front.
Immediately the Spanish working classes demanded that the reforms legis
lated during the period from 1931 to 1933 be put into operation.

Strikes

and riots broke out when the government could not implement the reforms
as quickly as the working classes expected.

This violence was recipro

cated by the Fascist and right-wing groups whose aim was to disgrace and
weaken the Madrid government by creating a state of anarchy.

Through

the Fascist and Catholic newspapers, world opinion became convinced that
Spain was, in fact, suffering from uncontrollable social disorder.
The defeat of the rightist parties in the municipal elections con
vinced the leaders of the Army, the Church and the landed interests that
democratic measures were insufficient to combat the growing progressive

12
elements.

On July, the assassination of Calvo Sotelo,

a rightist

political leader, set off another series of social disorders that cul
minated in the July l 8 rebellion of the Spanish Foreign Legion stationed
A.M. van der Esch. Prelude tc War, (New York, I 96 I), 3-4.
after cited as Esch.

Here

^Qjbid., 4.
^^Francisco Franco y Bahamonde. (1892 -). Chief of Staff of the Army,
Military Commander of the Canary Islands, 1936. Leader of the Rebel
or Nationalist forces, 1936-1939- Spanish Chief of State, 1939 to present.

1934.

12

Calve Sotelo. (1893-1936)Murdered by Leftists on July I3 .

Leader of the Monarchist party.

7
in Spanish Morocco «

General Franco flew from the Canary Island, where

he had been assigned by the Republican government because of his political
beliefs, to Morocco to take charge of the rebellion.

At approximately

the same time, military garrisons throughout Spain rose in rebellion
against the government authorities.

The uprising succeeded in the major

Spanish cities of Cadiz, Jerez, Aleçiras and Seville, but failed in Madrid
and B a r c e l o n a . T h e failure of the coup d'etat in Madrid and Barcelona
was because of the energetic resistance of the working classes.
By July 22, the coup d* état had turned into a civil war.

The Rebels

were in control of the army, the major part of the airforce and a small
portion of the navy.

The Madrid government commanded the loyalty of the

navy, the police force and the working classes.
With the government controlling the navy, it was dangerous if not
impossible to ferry the Rebel forces from Morocco to Spain in order to
support the rebellious garrisons.

Without the support of the Spanish

legionaires, the uprising in Spain could not succeed.

It looked as if

the army had failed in its attempts to control the political destiny of
Spain.
Since Hitler's rise to power, German propaganda activities had become
increasingly evident in Spain.

This was especially true among the large

German colony in Madrid and Barcelona.

Spanish rightist newspapers

became convenient mediums for the dissemination of the Nazi propaganda
material.

The German embassy and legations in Spain also distributed

money and propaganda material to the Spanish Fascists.

It was rumored

^^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, (New York, I96 I), 204.
after cited as Thomas.

Here

that the Spanish Falange received some three million pesetas yearly from
Ik
these German sources.

An important bridge of communication between the

Spanish Falangists and the Nazi officials was the Ibero-American Institute
in Berlin, under the leadership of General Wilhelm Faupel.

15

During the conservative administration in Spain from 1933 to 1936,
right-wing Spaniards made several contacts with German officials.
February 1936, General Sanjurjc

In

and José Primo de Rivera visited Germany

on a winter-sports holiday at Partenkirchen.

While in Germany, Sanjurjo

was taken on a tour of the Germans arms factories by Admiral Canaris, head
of German Military Intelligence.

17

In the summer of 1936 German activities in Spain increased.
German State Railroads opened a tourist office in Madrid.

The

The official

German news service, Deutsche Nachrichter Bureau, also expanded operations
in Spain by establishing an office in Madrid staffed by two German foreign
18

correspondents.
In July 1936 , Germany reacted to the events in Spain by publicly
stating that the struggle was a battlefield upon which western European
it
Dante A. Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-19^1, (New York,
Hereafter cited as Puzzo.

1 9 6 2 ), k6-kj.

^^General Wilhelm Faupel.
(1873-19^5)» Head of the Ibero-American
Institute in Berlin. German Charge d' Affaires to Nationalist Spain, 1936.
Ambassador to Spain, 1936-1937- Recalled from Spain in September of 1937.
^^General José Sanjurjc. (1 87 2 -I9 3 6 ). Leader of the unsuccessful
1932 revolt against the Republic. Titular head of the 1936 revolt.

17

Although there is no doubt that these visits did take place, there
is no documentary evidence that German officials promised aid to the
Spanish in the event of a military uprising in Spain.
^®Henry Buckley, Life and Death of the Spanish Republic (London, 19tO ),
203-204. Hereafter cited as Buckley.

9
civilization combated Bolshevism.

Hitler welcomed the Spanish revolt as

an opportunity to further his own plans in Europe.

If he could create

0 nough diplomatic tension over the Spanish situation by backing Italian

intervention and by aiding the Spanish Rebels with a minimum of help, he
could then perhaps draw diplomatic attention away from his manoeuvers in
central Europe.

An added advantage would be that Italy, by its inter

vention, would become embroiled with Britain and France and as a conseq19

uence move closer towards Germany.

Hitler also entertained definite ideas of the acquisition of material
benefits from Spain. He was especially interested in the Spanish mineral
resources of wolfram and copper ores that were vital to the German arma
ment industry and the Four Year Plan.

In the case of any future con

frontation with Britain and France, Hitler wanted Spain politically akin
and economically dependent upon Germany.

This would enable Germany to

menace the communications and commercial routes of Britain and France.
When the Spanish Civil War broke out in July 1936, the diplomatic
stage of Europe was occupied with the British and French attempts to
reconstruct the Locarno agreements which had been destroyed by the German
reoccupation of the Rhineland.

In July, the League, with British and

French support, realized the ineffectiveness of the sanctions against
Italy and withdrew them.

Thus the last major obstacle in the way of

improving British-French Italian relations was elminated.

The withdrawal

of the economic sanctions was an attempt by the British and French to

^^Ivone Kirkpatrick, Mussolini, A Study in Power, (New York, 1^64),
34o . Hereafter cited as Kirkpatrick.

10
acquire Italian goodwill and assistance in restoring the Locarno pacts.
But the Spanish Civil War with French, British, Russian, German and
Italian intervention handicapped any efforts to ease European tensions
after the Abyssinian affair.
The Spanish Civil War was not an isolated event.

It was not merely

a domestic problem but influenced European politics and international
relations tc a large extent.

The ideological, political and economic

competition among the European powers in Spain contributed significantly
to the solidification of the major European states into power blocs which
were to struggle for the mastery of Europe during World War II.

CHAPTER I

GERMAN MILITAEY AND TECHNICAL AID
TO THE SPANISH NATIONALISTS
1 9 3 6 -1 93 9

"The situation prevailing in Spain in 1936 was conducive to foreign
intervention.'’^

Both Spanish political groups, right and left, espoused

political ideologies taken from the traditional and current practices of
western Europe.

Thus the various political groupings in Spain reflected,

respectively, the political philosophies and practices of dictatorship,
as exemplified by Nazi Germany, and democracy, as exemplified by the
French Popular Front.

It was therefore natural that the major powers of

Europe became involved with the developments in Spain by aiding, materi
ally and diplomatically, their ideological comrades in arms. Other
reasons motivated foreign intervention, but those expressing political
or idealoglcal considerations involved prestige, which at the diplomatic
conjuncture of 1936 was an important element of the European situation.
In Spain "neither side in this unfolding conflict felt equipped to

2
fight it successfully."

The Rebel forces could count on approximately

9 4 ,0 0 0 troops under the separate commands of General Emilo

Mola, com

mander of the Northern Army, General Franco, commander of the Army of

^Norman J . Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the
Spanish Civil Strife, (New York, 1939), 119- Hereafter cited as Padelford■
^Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, (New York, I 96 I), 205-206.
Hereafter cited as Thomas.

12
Africa and General Queipo de Llano^ commander of the military garrison
in Sevelle.

Ecwever, the Legionaires and Moroccan troops stationed in

Spanish Morocco comprised the only efficient and well equipped force
under Rebel control.

But the troops in Morocco, under the command of

General Franco, had no communications with the Peninsula and no means to
cross the Straits of Gibraltar in order to link up with the other Rebel
forces in an attempt to capture Madrid.

Conscious of the deficiencies

of his forces. Franco, as early as July 19, decided to seek foreign
assistance.

In the meantime, the Loyalist government

suffered from an

acute shortage of arms and trained combat troops. With its control of
the bank of Spain which contained the sixth largest gold reserve in the
world, the Republic also decided to seek arms abroad.

4

The Rebel’s attempts to acquire foreign assistance for their efforts
to defeat the Loyalist government can be divided into three separate and
unconnected appeals.

General Franco appealed to the German government

for aid through the German embassy in Paris and sent personal representa
tives to Hitler.

General Mola, commander of the Rebel forces in the

Northern provinces of Spain, sent personal representatives to Berlin and
Rome distinct from those sent by Franco.

In fact, the German authorities'

in Berlin were astonished that the Spanish emissaries had no knowledge of
each other's mission.

In addition, General Queipo de Llano requested

German aid through the German consul in Seville.

All three of these

3
The Spanish Republican government is hereafter referred to as the
Loyalists. The opposing forces are hereafter referred to as the Rebels
cr the Nationalists.
4

Thomas, 205-206.

13
requests were Independent of each other and indicated that there was no
communication nor coordination of effort between the three Rebel generals.
Franco's first appeal for German aid was in the form of a dispatch
on July 22 from the German consul at Tetuan to General Kuhlental, Military
Attache of the German embassy in Paris.
"General Franco and Lieutenant Colonel Beigbeder^ send greeting to
their friend, the honorable General Kuhlental, inform him of the new
Nationalist Spanish Government, and request that he send ten trooptransport planes with maximum seating capacity through private
German firms.
Transfer by air with German crews to any airfield in
Spanish Morocco . "6
At approximately the same time, Rebel, airforce officer Captain
Francisco Arranz, with Adolf Langenheim, head of the Nazi party in Tetuan,
and Johannes Bernhardt, a German businessman and director of the economic
branch of the Auslandsorganisation^ in Tetuan, took off in a captured
German Lufthansa plane D-APOK-destination Berlin.^

They carried with

them a private letter from Franco to Hitler supporting Colonel Beigbeder's
request for German aid.

Landing at Berlin's Tempelhof airport on July 25

with instruction to negotiate with the German authorities for the purchase
of planes and war materials, the trio proceeded directly to the head
quarters of the Auslandsorganisation.

Colonel Juan Beigbeder Atienza.
(1890-1957)■ Veteran of the Mor
occan wars and Spanish military attache at the Spanish embassy in Berlin
in 1936°
^united States, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Vol.
Ill, Series D, (Washington, 194"^,” 3-4. 'Hereafter cited as GFD.
7

The Auslandsorganisation was the foreign organization of the Nazi
party. It contacted and organized German nationals in foreign countries.

8
GFD., 7-8 .

lu
That evening Hitler, returning from the theater, was notified of the
develcpments in Spain and of the Spanish rebels' request for aid.
then sent for Goering,
Military Intelligence.
support to Franco.

9

Blomberg,

10

He

and Admiral Canaris, head of German

At this meeting Hitler decided to give active

In his testimony at Wuremburg, Goering stated that

he had urged Hitler to give support to the Spanish rebels in order to
step the spread of communism and to enable him, Goering, to test the
combat and technical efficiency of the Luftwaffe.
supported the idea of German aid to Spain.

Admiral Canaris also

Hitler agreed and appointed
11

Canaris as the go-between for the coordination of the German aid program.
In the meantime, the German Foreign Ministry, knowing of the Spanish
request and of the arrival in Berlin of the two emissaries from Franco,
advised the Auslandsorganisation "against bringing the two officers into
contact with official Party authorities and against promoting their plans
here in any way. . .

12
"

Dieckhoff, Director of the Political Department

of the Foreign Ministry, and his superior, Baron von Weurath^^ refused to
agree tc the deliveries of German war material to the Spanish rebels be
cause cf the impossibility of keeping the deliveries a secret and of the
9

Hermann Goering. (1893-19^6). Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe,
1934-1939- Head of the German Four Year Plan, 1936.
^^Field Marshall Werner von Blomberg.
Chief of the Wehrmacht, 1935-1938.

(i8T9“1946).

Commander-in-

11
United States, Trial cf the Major War Criminals before the Inter
national Military Tribunal, Vol. II. (Efuremburg, 19^7), 280-8l. Here
after cited as TMWC.
^^GFD., 10-11.
""^Constantin von Neurath.
1932 -3 8 .

f1873-1956 ).

German Foreign Minister,

15
acnsequences that might develop for the Germans residing in Loyalist
Spain.

On July 2h, Neurath told the War Ministry that ''in the view of

the Foreign Ministry compliance with the Spanish request is out of the
,l4
question at this time."
Neurath’s negative attitude was without the
knowledge that Hitler was in the process of deciding to aid the Spanish
Nationalists.

In fact, the Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark con

cerning Hitler’s July 25th decision.

Ihis is shown by the fact that as

late as July 28, the Foreign Ministry still opposed German aid to Spain.
Although the Foreign Ministry was against aid to the Rebels, the
Nazi party maintained the opposite viewpoint.

The part played by Lang

enheim and Bernhardt, both members cf the Nazi party, indicated that
the policy followed was that of the NSDAP and not that of the Foreign
Ministry.
At the July 25 th meeting between Hitler, Blomberg, Goering and
Canaris, and in subsequent meetings, a department was created in the War
Ministry to supervise the recruitment of volunteers and the dispatch of
war materials to the Spanish rebels.
COS 'W'.

This department was termed the

Two holding companies, Hisma and Rowak, were set up to control

all trade between Germany and Spain.

If a German trader wished to sell

anything to Spain, he would have to sell it first to Rowak, the German
half of the company, who would then deliver it to Spain where it would
be marketed by Hisma.
A fleet of merchant ships assembled at Hamburg and departed for

^^GFD., 7 .
^^Thomas, 230-231.

16
Spain under the escort of the German navy.

Thirty Junkers, 52 transport

aircraft were sent immediately to Morocco.

A "tourist group" under the

direction of General von Scheele was set up in order to send volunteers
to man the aircraft and to form a training contingent for the Spanish
army.

On July 31; eighty-five men left Hamburg for Cadiz with six Heinkel

fighter planes and arrived on August 5-

These first contingents of aid

to France were soon followed by engineers, technicians and more fighter
planes.

In September, more fighter planes were dispatched along with

two tank companies, a battery of anti-aircraft guns and some reconnaissance
aircraft.

The tank companies were under the command of Colonel von Thoma,

while General von Scheele was the military head of the German holding
company in Spain, Hisma.

The mission of von Thoma and his officers was

partly to train troops and partly to gain battle e x p e r i e n c e G e n e r a l
Goering was appointed by Hitler as administrator of the Four Year Plan,
and in this position had charge of the German arms deliveries and the
release of foreign currency for the cost of the German supplies to Spain.
This elaborate aid organization was created within a week of the arrival
of Franco's representatives in Berlin.
Both War Minister Blomberg and General Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief
cf the Army, shared the Foreign Ministry's negative attitude towards
sending aid tc Spain.

The German army was inclined to follow a cautious

policy towards Spain and strongly opposed committing any substantial
number of German troops.

It was because of this pressure by the High

Command that German aid to Spain did not include a large: number of ground

227- 231 .

IT
fcrces.

vhus the German participation in the Spanish war was limited

primarily to the Luftwaffe, whose activities caused additional friction
IT
between Hitler and the High Command of the army.
On August 2 5 ^ Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg appointed Lieutenant
General Karl Warlimont as German military advisor to General Franco.
Blomberg told Warlimont that Hitler had decided to send limited aid to
Spain.

Although German air support would be extensive, "any ground support

would consist only of armaments and sufficient personnel to train Spanish
-I8
troops in its use.'
On August 26, Warlimont proceeded to Rome accompanied by Admiral
Canaris.

While in Rome they conferred with Mussolini and General Mario

Eoatta, Canaris' Italian counterpart.
would also furnish Franco with aid.

Here it was agreed that Italy
By early September Warlimont had

made contact with Franco at his headquarters in Caceres.^^
German military opinion was still cautious by mid-August.

Admiral

Raeder had asked Hitler for a decision on German policy towards Spain,
while adding that in his opinion Germany could not assume the risks of
intervention.

Raeder was especially worried, since almost the entire

German fleet was ordered to Spanish waters'.

20

In the meantime. Franco had no difficulty in crossing the straits
IT

Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the
Third Reich, (New York, 1952), 13^. Hereafter cited as 8 and S.
^^United Nations Security Council, Report of the Sub-Committee on
the Spanish Question, (New York, 1946), T- Hereafter cited as United
Nations.
19

Ibid., T.

ZOoFD., 50-52.

18
with ths aid of the German and Italian transport planes.

The German navy

also assisted by running interference for the Rebel troop transports
against the Loyalist naval vessels.

In one month, l4,000 Spanish and

Moroccan troops had been ferried across the straits by German and Italian
aircraft.

The German technical advisor in charge of the airlift was

Captain Heinchen.

The Italians supplied fighter cover for the merchant

ships which had by August 5 ferried some 2,500 men with equipment from
Morocco tc Spain.

’’Hence forward Franco was in command of the Straits.

An army would therefore be assembled at Seville, to march due north to
cut off the whole Portuguese frontier from the Republicans, to join

.21
forces with Mola and to advance upon Madrid along the Tagus valley.
With the steady flow of German and Italian war materials to the Rebel
forces, the military situation in Spain took on a new character.

Mola

and Franco, in the north and South respectively, led the two major
campaigns.

General Franco with his Army of Africa advanced northward

from Seville, while General Mola with the Army of the North advanced
against the Basque province cf Guipuzcoa.

The rapid advance of the two

forces was made possible by German and Italian aid.
At this time, the main route for German supplies to Spain was
through Portugal.

To coordinate the purchase of these war materials.

General Franco's brother Nicolas Franco was sent to Lisbon under the
cover name cf Aurelio Fernando.

His job was to supervise the procurement

22
cf war materials from Germany.
21
22

Thomas, 235GF3., 2 6 .

After being unloaded in Portuguese Ports,

19
the material was then shipped by rail through customs without inspection,
and on to the Rebels.

On August 22, the German Chargé d'Affaires in

Lisbon notified Berlin that Hisma cooperated with the Rebel officials
in shipping German war material across Portuguese territory.
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Antonio

Salazar, dictator of Portugal, believed that a Loyalist victory in Spain
would mean eventual communist take-over in Portugal. He was therefore
ready to give full support to the forces of General Franco.
The Loyalist government in Madrid was by no means idle concerning
foreign assistance.

During the first two weeks of August, its repre

sentatives in Paris were asking for planes and munitions from the French
government.

In order to eliminate the dilemma that the Spanish request

caused for French public opinion and the foreign policy of the Quai
d ’Orsay, the French government on August 1, directed an appeal to the
principal European governments to adopt an attitude of non-intervention
towards the Spanish conflict.

In the meantime, while French supplies

continued to reach the Loyalists, the French government announced that
if it was supplying arms to Spain, others were doing the same thing.
But because of the division cf public opinion over aiding the Loyalists,
French aid could not continue indefinitely without the fall of the Blum
government.
While Franco advanced northward in an attempt to capture Badajoz,
Mola'8 fcrces engaged in an offensive against the Basque cities of
San Sebastian and Irun.

Because cf the initial Rebel failure to control

the northern provinces of Spain at the outset of the revolt, Mola's plan
23
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fer a quick thrust southward over the Guadarrama mountains to take Madrid
had tc be discarded for fear of an attack from the rear.

Thus he was

forced to reverse direction and concentrate his efforts upon sealing off
the French border In order to cut off French aid to the Basques.

2 I4.

Mola

needed planes, bombs and rifle and machine gun ammunition in order to carry
cut the offensive.

He therefore requested through the German embassy In

Paris on August 8, I 5 , and 16, that these materials be sent to him
immediately.

The point cf delivery was to be La Coruna.

In his request

Mela also complained that thus far the southern group had been supplied
25

exclusively.

On August ih, Franco succeeded In capturing Badajoz.

This frontier

town was strategically vital for the Rebels because It enabled Franco to
open up a line of communication with Lisbon, the port of entry for most
cf the German war material.
were also Improved.

Communications between Franco and Mola

Aiding Franco In his northward offensive was the

arrival in Seville on August 9 of ten new Italian Savola tri-motor bombers
accompanied by twenty Italian pilots, eighteen German Junker tri-motor
bombers with thirty German pilots, six German pursuit planes and six
German anti-aircraft guns of the latest m o d e l . O n August 25, the Rebel
forces arrived within effective bombing distance of Madrid.
27 and 28 , German Junkers 52 bombed Madrid.

On August

The bombing evidently had its

effect for on August 28, General Faupel, German Charge d'Affairs in Spain,
Ji
The French border was opened on August 8, but was soon closed
because cf British pressure. However France continued to ship material
tc Spain.
2S
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notified Berlin that this action threatened to endanger the safety of
the official German representatives residing in Madrid and the German
colony in the city.

27

On August 2k, Germany adhered to the French embargo proposal on war
materials to Spain.

If Germany continued its shipments of material to

the Spanish Rebels, it would now have to be done with the utmost secrecy.
This Germany began to do on August 27, by notifying all German embassies
and legations dealing with the Spanish Rebels that henceforth all reports
concerning German aid to the Rebels or the requests for such aid should

28
be sent by way of courier or cipher.
The Spanish Rebels were also assisted by the activities of the German
An example of German naval aid to the Rebels occurred on August 17

navy.

outside of the harbor of Ceuta on the southern coast of Spain.
Loyalist warship Jaime I

The

was preparing to resume its bombardment of

Rebel ports when the German 'pocket' battleship Deutschland manouevered
itself between the habor facilities and the Loyalist ship, thus making
it impossible tc bombard the harbor.

The Deutschland became involved in

another incident when on August 3 it visited the rebel controlled port
L'f Ceuta accompanied by the torpedo boat Luche. Admiral Carls, Commander
cf the German High Seas Fleet, and Secretary of Legation Fischer of the
German embassy in Madrid, disembarked in order to greet General Franco
and to compliment him on his efforts against the Loyalist government.
By the end of August, reports indicated that there were at least eight
27

Germany did not extend do jure recognition to Franco until November

1 9 3 6 , and therefore still maintained diplomatic representatives in Madrid.

28
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German •warships in Spanish waters.

For a navy the size of Germany's,

this was a major deployment of its fcrces.
Throughout August, Franco's position as leader of the Rebels steadily
improved.

This was because of his military successes and the contacts

he had established with Germany and Italy.

Both countries held the

opinion that Franco was an able military leader and could be influenced
by them.

29

At a meeting of the Rebel Military Junta on September 12,

Franco was named head of the Rebel military command.

This was not with

out grumbling by General Cabanellas who held more seniority than did
Franco.

A month later Franco was named Head of State, thus completing

his rise to power in Nationalist Spain.

On October 2, an administrative

Junta was created to carry out the Rebel administrative functions.
These actions solidified the Rebel government and made it more capable
of facing the non-military problems which confronted the Military Junta.
On October 6, Hitler sent verbal congratulations to Franco on his becoming
Head of State.

Franco replied by thanking Hitler for his invaluable

aid.
During the month of September and the first half of October, Rebel
attempts to encircle Madrid proceeded slowly and systematically from four
directions:

from the northeast towards Guadalajara, from the north from

Semesierra, from the west from San Martin de Valdeiglesias, and from
the southwest from T o l e d o . D u r i n g these battles around Madrid, the
Loyalist forces continued to receive war materials from Russia which

Thomas, 2jk,
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previously declared in the London Non-Intervention Coimnittee

31

that it

would not be bound to observe non-intervention to any greater extent
than the other members of the Committee.

From October 20 to the 28th,

at least nine Russian cargo ships reached Loyalist ports.

Their cargos

included 100 trucks, 25 tanks, 30 pieces of artillery, 1 ,5 0 0 tons of
ammunition and 6,000 tons of diesel oil.^^

With the arrival of the
33
Russian material and the International Brigades,
the Madrid defenders
were able to resist the Rebel attacks.

Germany now faced the decision

whether to increase its aid to Franco in order for him to take Madrid,
or to withdraw altogether.
On October 30, Weurath instructed Admiral Canaris to inform General
Franco that Germany held a poor opinion of the combat tactics of the
Rebel forces. Canaris was also instructed to report to Franco that Germany
would send more assistance, but with the stipulation that if Franco
accepted this aid, the German reinforcements would be under German command.
Franco agreed, and on November 6 the Condor Legion with Geheral von
Sperrle3^

as commander and Colonel Richthofen^^ as chief of staff, dis

embarked at Seville.

The Condor Legion included a battle group of four

bomber squadrons of twelve Junker 52 bombers each, a fighter group of
Heinkels 51 and Messerschmidts 109 of the same strength, and a seaplane.
3^Thomas, 309<
^^The International Brigades included personal volunteers from Western
Europe, Russia and the United States, plus many other countries. Their
political beliefs were to the left if not actually Communist oriented.
They had come to Spain to fight for their fellow workers and political
freedom.
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Hugo Sperrle. Commander of Condor Legion Nov. 1936 to Oct. 1937^^Baron von Richthofen. (l895-)- Chief of Staff of Condor Legion,
1 93 7 -1 9 3 8 . Commander, Nov. 1938 to May 1939-

2h
reconnaisance and experimental squadron.

This force was supported by

anti-tank and anti-aircraft units plus two armored units of sixteen
tanks each.

The total number of personnel amounted to 6,500 men.

Al

though the Condor Legion proved to be an effective fighting force
throughout the civil war, it operated under very primitive conditions.
It flew mainly without radio and its machine-gun had to be reloaded by
hand. An additional force of gunnezy, mine and signal specialists was
later assigned to the Legion.

These latter units operated from the

battleships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer.

Additional reinforcements

continued to arrive throughout the year. On November 17, some 1,200
Germans arrived in Seville.

On December 1, 1,500 Germans landed at Cadiz

while at the same time a force of 2,500 landed at Vigo.

By the first

week of January 1937, United States sources estimated that there were
approximately 12,000 Germans in Spain and that eighty percent of the Rebel
airforce was German.
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While the Condor Legion was a highly specialized

air attack and defense unit, it was used primarily for the tactical support
of Franco's ground forces.

The German planes and artillery made a major

contribution to Franco's eventual victory.
The Condor Legion was reinforced with airforce personnel and a few
army specialists, but its total strength never exceeded 20,000 men.

The

Condor Legion personnel were constantly being rotated by General Goering
in an effort to provide extensive combat experience for a large number of

^^General Adolf Galland, The First and the Last, (London, 1955), 26.
As taken from Thomas, 317-
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men.

Those who were selected for the Spanish tour of duty were under

strict orders to maintain absolute silence concerning their activities in
Spain.

The commanders of the Legion were also rotated.

Field Marshal

Hugo Sperrle returned to Germany in November 1937 to take command of the
air fleet based at Munich.

His successor, General Volkmann,

command until November of 1938.
Luftkriegsacademie.
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held

Volkmann was later put in charge of the

The last commander of the Legion was General Wolfram

von Richthofen, who served as Chief of Staff for both Sperrle and Volkmann.
General Faupel, German Chargé d'Affaires in Spain, reported to Berlin
on December 10 that Franco's successes in the first six weeks were because
of his use of Moroccan troops and the lack of coordination on the Loyalist's
side.

The Loyalists had since increased their resistance through the use

of Russian war material and a certain amount of political and military
cooperation among their ranks.
needed more arms and ammunition.

To.counteract this new resistance. Franco
Fuapel also recommended that the German

officers training Spanish officer material in the methods of modern war
fare must be increased by sending to Spain all available German officers
who served as instructors in South America.

Again Faupel requested that

Berlin dispatch an effective German army unit trained in offensive tactics.
This unit could be used to achieve a breakthrough on the Madrid Front which
at present had developed into a stalemate.

Friction between the various

German officials in Spain was indirectly mentioned by Faupel when he
ended his dispatch by noting that he was in no way interfering with the
work of Sperrle or Funk, the German military advisor to Franco, but was
8^Ceneral Hellmuth Volkmann.
(I886 -). German General of Aviation.
Commander of the Condor Legion, Nov. 1, 1937-Nov. 1, 1938.
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supporting their

e f f o r t s . 3^

The latent quarrel between the NSDAP and the German military came to
the surface in Spain.

These troubles continued throughout the civil war.

The basic point of contention was the problem of which German official
held authority in what sphere of activity.

A rivalry developed between

Scheele and Bernhardt as to which one was Hitler's personal delegate to
Franco.

There also existed a mutual hatred between Sperrle and Faupel

because of Sperrle's criticisms of Hisma.

Eventually both of them were

recalled by Berlin.
Until December, there was little if any coordination or cooperation
between the War Ministry and the Foreign Ministry concerning the Spanish
aid program.

In fact, the Nazi party controlled most of the deliveries

to and from Spain in cooperation with the War Ministry but without con
sulting the Foreign Ministry.

As early as October 16, Goering complained

of a lack of adequate personnel.

Rudolph Hess, Nazi party Secretary, put

the whole foreign organization of the NSDAP at Goering's disposal.

Eber-

hard von Jagwitz, the head of the Party's foreign office, now worked
directly under Goering.

The German Foreign and Economic Ministries

were not notified of the activities of the NSDAP or of the existence of
Rowak and Hisma until mid-October.

The Foreign Ministry's ignorance of

the activities of the Nazi party and the War Ministry became evident on
December 2 when the War Ministry agreed with Weizsaecker's^^ request of
19
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^^Ernst von Weizsaecker.
(1882-1951)
Director of Political Dept,
of the Foreign Ministry, 1936-1938. State Secretary, 1938-19^3-
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November 30 that there should be more cooperation between the two
ministries.

Despite their demand for more coordination of policy, the

Foreign Ministry remained badly informed of the activities of Goering's
agents in Spain throughout the German involvement in the Spanish Civil
hi
War.
On December 1$, Neurath, in response to the continual requests by
Faupel and Sperrle for regular German army divisions in Spain, informed
the War Ministry that he was not in favor of sending such divisions to
Spain while the Great Powers in the Non-Intervention Committee attempted
to limit the conflict and bring about mediation.

Neurath's position in

regard to the Spanish situation had always been of extreme caution.

He

opposed the original Spanish request for German aid on July 25, and on
August 2h convinced Hitler that it was advantageous for Germany to agree
to the French embargo plan for prohibiting the exportation of war materials
to Spain.

hp

The High Command of the A m y and the War Ministry supported Neurath's
position regarding the dispatch of regular army units to Spain.

Despite

the German attitude, Hassel, the German ambassador to Italy reported that
Mussolini was going ahead with his planned shipments of regular Italian
troops to

S

p

a

i

n

.

The inclination in Berlin seemed to be that Germany

would not exceed the quantity of aid already given to Franco.

It was

decided to let Italy take the lead in providing Franco with combat troops.^

^^GFD., lh9,
hp
Ibid., 168.
^3gfd., 169.
^\bid. , 198.
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At the end of 1936 the failure of the Rebel offensive against Madrid^
despite the use of German Incendiary bombs, caused gloom among the
nationalists and their foreign supporters.

The Loyalists' Increased

resistance was evident along the entire front.
In January, French newspapers printed alarmist reports of large
German troop concentrations In Spanish Morocco.

The reports went on to

say that these forces had practically taken over the economic resources
of the area.

The French government was particularly alarmed over these

developments since. If true, they represented a decisive threat to French
security In North Africa.

The French government Immediately reacted to

these reports by concentrating troops along the border of the French
zone of Morocco.

On January 9, France reminded the officials In the

Spanish zone of Morocco of the French-Spanlsh convention of November 2T,
1 9 1 2 , In which Spain agreed not to alienate any of her rights In the

Spanish zone to a third party.

On January 11, Hitler, In a speech before

foreign diplomats In Berlin, assured the French Ambassador, FrançolsPonçet, that Germany had no territorial ambitions In Spanish Morocco
or In Spain.

In a more public manner, the official German press organs

spoke of the whole affair as a French attempt to discredit Germany.
In the meantime. General Faupel Informed the Foreign Ministry on January
that the only German units in Spanish Morocco was a squadron of seven
seaplanes at Mellila.
During the month of January, Germany decided upon her basic military

^^J.C. DeWllde, Foreign Policy Reports, "The Struggle Over Spain,"
Vol. 14, (New York, April 1938), 15-16.
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policy towards aiding the Spanish rebels.

Franco's request for more aid

resulted in an Italo-German military conference scheduled for January
l4 in Rome.

The German delegation was led by General Hermann Goering,

while Mussolini headed the Italian delegation.

At this meeting it was

decided that no additional German personnel would be sent to Spain other
than replacements, and that further German contributions to Franco's war
effort would be in military supplies only.

Both Mussolini and Goering

agreed that final efforts to aid Franco should be completed by January 31,
and that dilatory tactics should be applied to the British control proposais in the Non-Intervention Committee until then.

This was decided

in expectation of the success of Franco's offensive against Madrid.
They also agreed that under no circumstances would they allow the widening
of the civil war into a general European w a r .
The German Foreign Ministry was evidently still in the dark as to
what direction German policy towards Spain would take in the future.
Unaware of what had been decided upon in Rome, Baron von Weizsaecker
remarked that the Spanish adventure was to be abandoned.
was how to withdraw from Spain gracefully.

The problem

Evidently the Foreign

Ministry was anxious to withdraw from Spain because of the international
consequences of continued German presence there.

In any event the

Foreign Ministry was interested in cooperating with the London NonIntervention Committee in attempting to limit the spread of the civil
war into a European war.

135.
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The failure of Franco's January offensive against Madrid disappointed
German officials who "believed that once Madrid fell, the civil war would
end in a Rebel victory.

They now believed that an end to the civil war

would be put off indefinitely and that a mediated peace would ultimately
mean a Loyalist victory unless Franco mobilized his heretofor untapped
reserve manpower and received more German equipment.

Germany at this

time was still not interested in attaining greater influence in the
planning and executing of Rebel offensives.

Germany was well aware that

undue interference in the Rebel conduct of the war would only arouse the
proverbial Spanish individualism and xenophobia.

If Germany did agree

to a joint German-Italian command and greater influence in the conduct
of the war, it would be burdened with a responsibility for the course
of operations which, up till now, it had avoided assuming.
On January 25, the German Foreign Ministry received Franco's
opinion on the January l4th Rome decisions.

Franco protested that, because

of the recent inability to capture Madrid, he needed more war material
than what was decided upon at the Rome conference.

Franco also pointed

out that if after January 31 Germany and Italy agreed to the British
proposals to establish a control system preventing materials from
reaching Spain, the effect of such a control system would work to the disadvantage of the Rebels.

In order to obtain needed supplies. Franco

told General Faupel on February T; that he would agree to the establishment
of a joint German-Italian general staff consisting of five German

^^GFD., 55 ^kg
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five Italians.

Both Faupel and Roatta took this under consideration

and agreed to report hack to Franco after consulting their governments.
After repeated attempts to convince the Berlin authorities of Franco's
need for more war material, Faupel finally enlisted the support of the
Italian ambassador to Spain, Maneini, and Lieutenant Colonel Funck,
German military observer to Franco's general staff, in requesting more
aid for the Rebels.

In a dispatch to Berlin on April 21, Faupel reported

that the civil war could not be won if it continued to be waged in its
present manner.

Both Faupel and Maneini were in favor of making further

German and Italian aid to Franco conditional on more influence to German
and Italian officers upon operations, and upon the training of more
Spanish recruits by German and Italian advisors.
Ihe Rebel forces followed the recommendations of the German
advisors during the winter offensives against Madrid.

This was evident

on January 5^ when the Rebel forces employed blitzkrieg tactics while
attacking the Loyalist's positions.

Intense bombing was followed by

the advance of tanks and mobile artillery, and then by infantry waves
supported by more t a n k s . T h e s e tactics had the effect of creating a
breach in the Loyalist's lines but did not enable the Rebel forces to
achieve a lasting penetration because of the lack of supporting troops
and material.
In the spring of 1937, the Rebel's continual hammering against the
Madrid defenses failed to make progress against the civilian resistance
supported by International Brigades and Russian war material.

^^Thomas, 3^9-
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therefore decided to begin the subjugation of the northern provinces
which were effectively cut off from foreign or Loyalist assistance.

The

Rebel military command thought that this area would be relatively easy
to conquer and by doing so would provide a much needed victory to bolster
Nationalist prestige.

The Basque iron ore,

as well as the

industries of

Bilbao were additional reasons for undertaking this offensive.

Also,

the

conquest of these provinces would remove pressure on the Rebel rear and
enable thousands of troops to be transferred to the Madrid front.

Generals

Mola and Davila commanded the Northern army which was to advance against
Bilbao and Santander.

The Army of the North contained a mixture of

Italian and Spanish ground troops supported by the Spanish airforce,
the Italian expeditionary airforce, and the Condor Legion.

The total

number of aircraft in support of the Army of the North amounted to
approximately 120 planes.
Preceding the offensive against the northern provinces, German
bombers and fighter planes carried out an intensified bombing of Basque
towns in order to weaken the Loyalist's defenses. On January k, Bilbao
was raided by nine Junkers 52 escorted by Heinkel fighter planes.

This:

indiscriminate bombing of open towns and non-military areas created deep
hatred and resentment against Germany.
On March 31, the Condor Legion bombed the country town of Durango,
a road and railway junction between Bilbao and the front.

The resultant

^^Claude G. Bowers, ^ Mission ^ Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for
World War II, (ifew York, 195"577~33B'. Hereafter cited as Bowers.
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destruction of the town included indiscriminate bombing of non-military
civilian areas.
to 15 ^.

5he death toll inflicted by the German planes amounted

Claude Bowers^ United States Ambassador to Spain at the time,

wrote in his book. My Mission to Spain, that this was "the most terrible
bombardment of a white civil population in the history of the world up
to March 3 I; 1937-^^

But this German crime against humanity was soon

surpassed in destructiveness and barbarity by the Condor Legion’s total
annihilation of the Basque's holy city of Guernica.
As the ancient capital of the Basques, Guernica stood for centuries
as the center of Basque religion, liberty and independence.

It was here

that the Catholic sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella granted the Basque
liberties which were renewed as recently as 1931 by the Republic.
Guernica is a small town in the province of Vizcaya, lying in a valley
ten kilometers from the sea and thirty from Bilbao. On April 26, General
Mola ordered a punitive raid on Guernica in retaliation for the stiff
resistence put up by the Basque troops.

German Heinkels 111 and Junkers

52 carried out a three hour bombardment of the market area of the town

where 7,000 people had gathered for their weekly market day.
people were killed and op9 wounded.

1,65^

Incendiary bombs gutted the town

and left it in a blazing fury after the planes departed.
This senseless bombing of populated civilian areas produced a furor
of protest in the world press . General Faupel was instructed by the
German Foreign Ministry to request Franco to issue a strong denial that

^^Bowers, 3 ^ 3 .
5^nThomas, 419-420.
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German fliers were responsible.

The official German newspapers in the

meantime blamed the destruction on the retreating Basque communists.
In London; British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden refused to issue a
communique asked for by Ribbentrop against the false reports concerning
Guernica.

There were rumors that Eden would propose an international

investigation.

Hitler expressed the view that Germany could not

consider an investigation of the incident.

Hermann Goering, Commander-

in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was later to admit at the Nuremburg War Trials
that Guernica was regarded as a testing ground for the German airforce.
In the meantime, the Army of the South, under the command of General
Queipo de Llano, was not idle.

On January 17, a rebel offensive began

against the large Spanish port of Malaga, located on the south-east
coast of Spain.

The offensive continued throughout January, and on

February J the Army of the South captured the city.
The victory at Malaga coincided with a new Rebel offensive to the
south-east of Madrid in the valley of the Jarama river.

The Rebel force

consisted of five mobile brigades, six l^^mm. batteries, and a German
artillery group of'88mm.guns. The objective of the offensive was the
Madrid to Valencia road, which was the remaining line of communication
between the defenders in Madrid and the Republican government at Valencia.
After two weeks of fighting, a stalemate resulted with the Rebels failing
in their objective, but penetrating some fifteen kilometers into Loyalist
territory.

Both sides suffered approximately 25,000 casualties.

55QFD., $79.
Thomas, 38 O .
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From March 30 tc June 19; the Army of the North concentrated on
capturing Bilbao ; the major industrial and mining center in Spain.

By

the first week of May^ the Basque defenders had been driven back to their
last defensive positions outside of Bilbao.
their bombing runs.

The Condor Legion continued

The Germans were experimenting with the idea of

dropping large numbers of small incendiary bombs on wooded areas to force
the Loyalists to leave their positions.
conferring with Mussolini.

MeanwhileNeurath was in Rome

The Duce told him that Germany and Italy

had made enough sacrifices for Franco and that he, Mussolini, would
inform Franco that the Italian troops would be withdrawn if the Rebels
did not conduct the war more energetically.
characteristic of Mussolini.
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This type of outburst was

He had invested an immense amount of men

and material in Spain despite the economic dislocations that the Abyssinian
affair created in the Italian economy.

Neither the Italian economy nor

Mussolini’s pride could withstand a long continuation of the civil war.
By the end of May, Germany had poured approximately I 50 million
Reichmarks into Spain.

If the present rate of deliveries continued, there

would be an additional, five or six million Reichmarks worth of war
materials delivered monthly to the Rebels.

The deliveries after May were

to be paid for in cash, contrary to the previous German policy of advancing
the Spanish Rebels credit for the purchase of German war

materials.

On June 23, the German navy decided to withdraw most of its war vessels
from Spanish waters.

Thomas , 737 ■
58 ,
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For the time being there remained a force consisting
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of one cruiser, four torpedo boats, and two U-boats.59

Two days later,

Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, stated in the British House
of Commons that according to British sources there were six destroyers,
one armored ship, four submarines and two cruisers of the Germany n^wy
operating in Spanish waters.

This information was obtained by the British

government prior to Germany's June 23 decision, for on July T, Cooper
told the Commons that the British government now had information revealing
that there were three submarines, one armored ship and one cruiser of the
German fleet in Spanish w a t e r s . Rumors in London had it that the
reason for the reduction of German war vessels in the Mediterranean was
that high German naval officers in Berlin had protested to Hitler that
the sending of the German ships to the Mediterranean increased the risk
of having the cream of the German navy bottled up in the event of a
general European conflict.

Whether or not this was the real reason for

the reduction of German ships, it was evident that Germany placed more
emphasis upon increasing the combat efficiency of the Rebel navy than
on using a large number of its own ships in support of the Rebels.
After the final collapse of Loyalist resistance in the Basque
provinces on June 19, General Franco paused before mounting his offensive
against Santander, a major Loyalist port on the Bay of Biscay.

During

this pause the Loyalists surprized the Rebel forces by launching an
offensive against the Rebel positions ten miles west of Madrid at Brunete.
Immediately Franco sent reinforcements from the Army of the North in order

60
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to halt the Loyalist advance.
also dispatched.

The Condor Legion and heavy artillery were

On July 24, the Nationalists succeeded in stopping the

Loyalist advance and instigating a counter-attack.

But further Rebel

advancement was. held up by Franco who wanted to concentrate on taking
Santander.

The Brunete offensive cost the Loyalists 25,000 men and about
6l

100 aircraft.

The Rebel forces lost 23 aircraft and 10,000 men.

German officers were quick to learn the tactical significance of the
battle of Brunete for the use of the tank.

The Loyalist’s tanks were

ineffective since they were spread out in support of infantry and thus
could be attacked and destroyed individually.

The Rebels, upon the

insistance of the German General von Thoma, concentrated their tanks upon
one point and thus used the tank force as a penetrating spear, followed
by waves of infantry.
General Faupel informed Berlin that in his opinion once the Brunete
crisis was over, Franco should continue his prepared offensive against
Santander.

Resumption of the Madrid offensive should be avoided.

Faupel

also noted that the Spanish forces lacked men trained in attack methods,
and therefore requested that a number of such assault divisions be sent
to Spain.

This request had previously been refused by both the German

High Command and the Foreign Ministry.

Faupel’s advice was subsequently

heeded by Franco, for a new offensive against Madrid was not initiated
but rather the northern campaign against Santander began.
During July, the British acquired a new prime minister,

^^Thomas, 461-462.
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Chamberlain.

British diplomacy under Chamberlain aimed at appeasing

Hitler and Mussolini more energetically than had been done under Stanley
Baldwin.

Britain’s primary aim was to secure friendship with Italy.

This was attempted on the assumption that better British-Italian relations
could also result in the easing of French-Italian tensions and could
conceivably bring about a settlement of the Spanish crisis through a
mediated peace.

But British diplomacy in this direction flounder upon

the continued shipments of Italian troops and war material to the Spanish
Rebel forces.

The increased Italian commitment to a Rebel victory resulted

not only in further estrangement of British-Italian relations but in the
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closer cooperation between Italy and Germany.
In mid-August the Army of the North began its offensive against
Santander.

The Rebel forces consisted of I 06 battalions supported by

63 batteries and the Condor Legion.
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Because of their overwhelming

superiority of air power, the Rebel victory on August 2% was never in
doubt.

Coinciding with the Santander campaign was the intensification

of attacks on merchant ships in the Mediterranean.
Franco become alarmed at the reports of increased Soviet shipping
reaching the Loyalists.

He therefore requested help from Mussolini and

the Italian navy in order to stop such shipments.

Mussolini agreed, and

during the month of August, Russian, British, French, and other neutral
ships were attacked in the Mediterranean by Italian submarines and
aircraft operating from Majorca.
^^Neville Chamberlain.

During the last of August the raids on

(l869“194o)

British statesmanj prime minister.

1 9 3 7 -1 9 4 0 .

^8 italy had joined the German^Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact on Nov
ember 6, 1937" On December 11 of the same year, Italy withdrew from the
League of Nations.
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merchant shipping increased, culminating in the August 31st submarine
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attack on the British destroyer Havock.

Because of this increased threat to commercial shipping in the Mediter
ranean, the British government decided to accept a French proposal calling
for a conference of Mediterranean powers.

On September 6, the British

and French governments jointly issued invitations to Germany, Italy, Russia,
Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Bulgaria and Rumania to send
representatives to a conference beginning on September 10 at Ryon, Switzer
In the meantime, the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden explained

land.

to Ernst Woermann,^^ German Charge d ’Affaires in London, that the confer
ence would deal only with the attacks upon commercial shipping in,the
Mediterranean.

There was no desire to exclude Germany from the Confer-
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ence.

Germany replied to the invitation on September 9 by recalling

the Deutschland and Leipzig i n c i d e n t s , a n d the British and French lack
of response to help Germany protect her ships.

Germany proposed that the

Conference be referred back to the London Non-Intervention Committee.
The Conference met as scheduled despite the German and Italian nonparticipation.
agreement.

On September l4 the participating states reached an

It was decided to counter-act with force any attacks made

upon merchant vessels in the Mediterranean.

The Ryon agreements had the

effect of making Italian interference with Russian aid to the Spanish
Loyalists extremely difficult.

Because of this, Germany and Italy had to

^^Ibid.
^^Dr. Ernst Woermann. Official in the German Foreign Ministry, 1933”
Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain, 1936-1938- Director of the
Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, 1938-19^31936.

^"^GFD. , 4 3 8 .
^^See Chapter II.
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increase their aid to Franco.
In the meantime, the Germans in Spain were quarreling among them
selves .

General Sperrle, commander of the Condor Legion and General

Faupel, official German representative to the Rebel government, mutually
disliked each other.
of the Hisma monopoly.

Sperrle refused to see Faupel and was also critical
Franco requested that Faupel be recalled, partly

because of his close relations with the Falange, but chiefly because
of his heavy-handed arrogance.

This was also due, no doubt, to Faupel's

continual interference with France's conduct of the war.
replaced by Eberhard von Stohrer,
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in late August.

Faupel was

Sperrle himself

was shortly recalled, being succeeded in command by General Volkmann.
By mid-August, Ciano was optimistic over military developments in
Spain.

The offensive against Santander proceeded successfully and the

Italian naval activities in the Mediterranean resulted in the sinking
of seven ships off the Spanish coast.

But he was still apprehensive over

the long duration of the war and the cost it involved for Italy.

On

August 16, he stated to the German ambassador to Italy, von Hassell,
that "the most important thing now was to clear up the Spanish question
which had been dragging on much tcc long; settlement of other questions
would become considerably easier after that."
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The Loyalists attempted another diversionary offensive during
August, this time on the Aragon front.

It was undertaken in an effort

to draw off some of France's men and material from the Rebel offensive
in Asturias.

To some degree it was successful, since the absence of

Dr. Eberhard von Stohrer. (l883-19^^)* German ambassador to Spain,
1937-19^3- Recalled for failing tc prevent the downfall of Serrano Suner.

^^GFD., 434 .
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of the Condor Legion prolonged the Rebel advance on Oviedo.

Though the

Loyalist pressure continued along the Aragon front until mid-October, it
did not produce the desired result of checking the Rebel advance on
Oviedo which was finally taken on October 21.

With the fall of Oviedo,

organized Loyalist resistance in the northern provinces collapsed.
The war in the north, the Basque, Santander and Asturias campaigns,
had been important for the use of an overwhelming air and artillery
superiority.

It was at this time that the Condor Legion developed the

tactic of carpet bombing.

This tactic involved flying in close formation

very low, and releasing all the bombs simultaneously, thereby producing
a devistating effect upon the entrenched Loyalists.

The conquest of

the Northern provinces, l8, 600 square kilometers of land and I-I/2
million people, brought the Rebels the Asturian coal fields and the
industries of Bilbao.

They also gained the north coast of Spain, en

abling the entire Nationalist Navy to concentrate in the Mediterranean,
and thereby create a stronger blockade of the Loyalist ports.

The

collapse of the Northern front enabled Franco to transfer 65,000 men of
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the Army of the North to the Madrid front.
There was a temporary quiet along all fronts in Spain following
the Asturias and Aragon campaigns.
until mid-December.

This lull lasted from mid-October

The Rebel army now consisted of about 600,000 troops.

It was divided into 65 O battalions of infantry, one division of cavalry,
and supported by 29 O artillery batteries plus 600 aircraft.

This main

body was sub-divided into three groups; the Army of the North, the Army

Thomas, 480-48l,
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of the Center, and the Army of the South under the respective commands
of Generals Davila, Saliquet, and Queipo de Llano.
aircraft made up the majority of the Rebel airforce.

German and Italian
These planes in-
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eluded Junkers 52 and Savoias 73, Fiats 32, Heinkels and Messerschmitts.

Franco's plan for a new offensive against Guadalajara in mid-December
was interrupted on December 15 by a Loyalist attack on Teruel, the tip
of the Rebel salient into Loyalist territory.

The salient extended

approximately 50 miles into Loyalist territory at a width of 25 miles.
German and Italian advisors urged Franco to continue with his plans for
attacking Guadalajara in spite of the Loyalist offensive.

Franco hesi

tated until December 23, when the political necessity of recapturing
Teruel became extremely important.

Franco's war effort was financed

through foreign and private backing and he could not risk the possibility
of being forced into a defensive position.

Any signs that the Rebel

forces were weakening, would have grace consequences for the continuation
of financial support.
On December 2Q, the Rebels began their counter-offensive.

As always,

the Condor Legion supported the ground forces by establishing air
superiority.

Because of being constantly moved from one area to another,

the headquarters of the Condor Legion was set up in a twelve car train
for mobility purposes.
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More German and Italian planes participated

in the battle of Teruel than at any one time during World War I.
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At this time, the Italians renewed their demands on Franco for an
73ibid., 488.
^^Thomas, 505~506.
^^Bowers, 3 7 2 .
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early military decision.

They thought that this could be best accom

plished through a unified German-Italian command.
actually refusing this idea, was cautious.

Germany, while not

Weizsaecker commented that

although a unified command might have advantages, such a command would
burden Germany with a responsibility that eventually might prove harmful
to German diplomacy.

Weizsawcker's attitude was justified, since if
ry/

there had been a unified command during the battle of Guadalajara,
Germany would have received the same loss of prestige for the defeat as
77
had the Italians.
On January 2, Weizsaecker informed the Italian Charge
d'Affaires, Magistrati, that Germany would not favor a unified command
in Spain.
Franco.

Germany preferred instead, direct personal influence on
General Blomberg, Minister of War, supported Weizsaecker's

position.

T8

The controversy over a unified command had been raging since 1936.
The Italians were especially interested in establishing a unified command
for reasons of prestige, and also because they thought that Franco was
making poor use of the Italian troops and conducting the war in a slow
and not altogether successful way.

Both Faupel and his successor

Stohrer requested the establishment of such a command.

From a purely

military standpoint, a unified command was desirable since this would
enable the Germans and Italians to operate independently from Franco and
ry/

March 8-13, 1937- Italy suffered a humiliating defeat. German
advisors attributed the defeat to the inability of the Italian troops to
wage modern warfare.
'^^GFD. , 543-

78

Ibid., 544.
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have greater influence over his operations.

But Berlin, for political

reasons, was not ready to assume the increased responsibility that a
greater influence on the Rebel war effort would burden them with.
During January and February the Germans assumed a cautious attitude
toward the Spanish adventure.

On February 1, Stohrer requested infor

mation from Berlin as to whether or not Germany would follow the Italian
lead and continue to supply Franco.

In Stohrer's opinion. Franco

desperately needed this aid, and unless pressured by Germany and Italy,
he would not assume the risk of any major action.

For this reason,

demands for more German influence on the conduct of the war should
accompany any additional German aid to Franco.

Weizsaecker answered by

stating that no decision would be made on military policy in Spain until
it was seen how Franco recovered from the Loyalist offensive against
Teruel.
Evidently the reason for the Foreign Ministry's hesitancy to lay
down any definite military policy towards Spain at this time was because
of the impending political and military shakeup in Berlin.

During

February, Hitler ousted Blomberg from the War Ministry and appointed
himself to the post.

Hitler also reorganized the army by creating the

High Command of the Arpiy,

and placing it under his personal control.
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General Wilhelm Keitel

was appointed as Chief of the High Command.

Hitler's reorganization plans also included the Foreign Ministry.

T^GFD , 575.
GOwilhelm Keitel.

(1882-1946).

Chief of the OKW, 1938-1945.
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Foreign Minister Neurath was replaced by Joachim von Ribbentrop,formerly
ambassador to Britain and one of Hitler’s lackeys.
One of Ribbentrop's first functions as Foreign Minister yas to assure
the Spanish ambassador to Germany that the Reich would continue its policy
of supporting Nationalist Spain.

Hitler also reiterated Germany's desire

to combat any attempts to bolshevize Spain, and added that Germany had
no territorial ambitions in Spain.
While assuring the Spanish Rebels of its continued support, Germany
was still uncertain as to whether or not to continue sending aid to
Franco.

Future German policy towards Spain depended upon the success oh

failure of the present Italo-British negotiations for a general settle
ment of outstanding difficulties between the two countries.

Since be

coming prime minister, Chamberlain, contrary to the wishes of his
Foreign Secretary, attempted to come to an understanding with Italy con
cerning the Mediterranean and Italian withdrawal from. Spain.

Eden was

not opposed to reconciliation with Italy, but was opposed to the policy
of appeasement which would ultimately be at the expense of British interests
and security.

Germany had to adapt its policy to any agreement between

Britain and Italy, or to any agreement reached in the London Non-Inter
vention Committee on the question of withdrawing foreign volunteers from
Spain.

Thus, Germany was anxious to convince Franco that he must make

maximum use of German and Italian volunteers in the next few months in
order to deliver a decisive military blow before the possibility of having
to withdraw German and Italian volunteers became a reality.

^^Joachim von Ribbentrop.
(1893-1946). Ambassador-at-Large, 1935Ambassador to Britain, 1935-1938. Reich Foreign Minister 1938-

1938.
1945.
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On March k, Franco Informed Stohrer that guerilla activities and
military incompetence of the local commander at Teruel were responsible
for the delay in his operations.

He assured Stohrer that present strategic

plans would achieve an early victory before the question of volunteers
became acute.

The offensive that Franco referred to was the buildup of

troops and material for the March 9 Rebel counter-offensive against
the Loyalist positions at Teruel.
At the end of March Germany was still pressuring Franco for a quick
decisive military blow that would result in a Rebel victory.

On March

30; General Volkmann, received instructions from the War Ministry to
urge Franco to continue military operations until all of Catalonia fell,
82

and not to divert his attention to other fronts .

The entire Condor Legion supported the March 9 Rebel offensive
against Catalonia.

The Legion now consisted of eight squadrons of

Messerschsmitts 109, four squadrons of Heinkels 51, a reconnaissance
group of Heinkels and Derniers I 7 and twelve squadrons of Heinkels III
and Junkers 5 2 .

The tank corps comprised approximately I80 tanks, while
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the anti-tank units numbered thirty companies.

During March and April the Loyalist resistance collapsed in the
face of overwhelming Rebel air superiority.

Franco used his aircraft

to drive the Loyalists from their positions and then over-run the area
with infantry supported by tanks. From this battle the German observers
82

GFD., 628.

^^Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill, (London, 1948). F. 0.
Miksche, Blitzkrieg, "(l^ondon 1941 ), 8 I. As taken from Thomas, 519-

i+7
learned a great deal about the use of fighter planes for supporting
infantry.

By April 15^ the Rebel forces succeeded in reaching the

Mediterranean coast and thus opening a wedge between the two principle
Loyalist cities of Valencia and Barcelona.
In view of the rapid advance of the Nationalists, Germany concluded
that its volunteers could start withdrawing from Spain without hindering
Franco's war effort.

Mounting tensions in Eastern Europe and the

concluding of Anglo-Italian agreement on April 6, made the German High
Command unenthusiastic about supplying the Nationalists with more men
and material.

Franco agreed, but on the condition that the Condor Legion

would leave behind its aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and other equipment
for use by German trained Spanish pilots.
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On April o, Weizsawcker

asked Magistrati, Italian Chargé d'Affaires, to cable Rome for Mussolini's
reaction to the withdrawal of German troops.

Germany needed these troops

at home for assimilation into an expanded training program.

The

Italian reply on June 8 stated that Italy had no intention of recalling
its troops at this time despite the Italian-British agreement, but that
they might be reduced.
In the meantime. Franco changed his mind.

On April 27, he informed

Stohrer that the Condor Legion would be of utmost value until final
victory was a s s u r e d . F r a n c o ' s change of heart was probably because
of the increased resistance of the Loyalists who were receiving supplies
from France since the opening of the Pyrenean frontier on March 17-

^^Ibid., 640.

GFD., 647.
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During June^ reports from Stohrer, Volkmann and other German officials
in Spain constantly stressed the need for re-equipping and re-supplying the
Condor Legion.

On June 11; General Volkmann cabled Berlin that no

supplies had reached the Condor Legion since the beginning of March; and
as a consequence the Legion was in urgent need of replacement parts and
new equipment.
worn out.

The 88mm. anti-aircraft artillery had been completely

The combat efficiency of the Legion had been reduced in half

as a result of worn out equipment and combat losses.
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' Both Eibbentrop

and Keitel approached Hitler on the urgent need for re-supplying the
Condor Legion; but it was not until the end of June that Germany finally
decided to continue supplying the Legion with the necessary equipment
to maintain its combat strength.

These supplies were not delivered on

the condition that further economic concessions from Franco be granted
to Germany; but Stohrer was to inform Franco of Germany's desire to
acquire certain mining rights in Spain.
Between the end of April and the end of JUly; the Rebel advancei
along the Mediterranean coast continued with increased difficulty as the
Rebels approached Valencia.

Although the Loyalists received enough war

materials from Franco to slow this advance; their source of supply was
steadily drying up.

On June 13; France; under pressure from Britain;

closed the Pyrenean frontier.

This was partly done in order to create a

favorable situation for Franco's acceptance of the plan for the withdrawal of volunteers decided upon in the Non-Intervention Committee.

^^Ibid.;
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See Chapter two.

Franco did not accept this plan.
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On June 30, Generak Kindelan, Commander of the Spanish Airforce,
approached Stohrer with the request that Spanish pilots be authorized to
take over a complete squadron of the Condor Legion.

The Spanish request

was granted, but on the condition that these planes remained under
German command.
As a result of the surprise offensive of the Loyalists along the
Ebro river during July, the Rebel forces once again desperately needed
supplies.

On August l4, Bernhardt, director of Hisma, telegraphed

Berlin urging that supplies be sent immediately to Franco, especially
artillery ammunition and airplane engines.

Goering was requested to

intervene personally so that these supplies would be delivered as quickly
as possible.
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By the end of August the Rebels succeeded in containing

the Loyalist offensive.

Both sides suffered immense losses in men and

material but the Loyalist could least afford it, since they did not have
the source of supplies that was available to the Rebels.

Because of the

weaknesses of both sides, four months of trench warfare followed.
During September of 1938 the Czech crisis preoccupied the attention
of Europe.

Franco was alarmed by this potentially dangerous situation

because of the possibility of a general war in which he might have to
contend with a French invasion.

During the crisis, German aid temporarily

stopped,because of the possible German needs in central Europe.

Franco

was annoyed at Germany for failing to inform him of its plans. However
on September 19, Germany informed Count Antonio Magaz, the Rebel Ambassador

^GFD., 7 1 2 .
^Ibid., 735.
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to Germany^ that there would he no change in German aid to Spain even if
91
war did come.
Franco became worried over Hitler’s promise to Chamberlain -during
the Munich conference on September 30 that Germany would withdraw her
volunteers from Spain if all foreign volunteers wéré withdrawn.

To FrancO;

it seemed that this cooperation between Germany and Britain might lead to
a mediated peace in Spain.

Franco’s apprehensions were not ill-founded,

for on October 2, Stohrer informed Berlin that Franco could not win a
military victory without extensive aid from Germany and Italy, and that
a peace by mediation would not necessarily be harmful to German interests.
In order to counteract the possibility of a mediated peace, Jordana
informed Stohrer on October 6 that a mediated peace in Spain would mean
that the civil war had been fought in vain.

Franco, far from accepting

mediation, demanded that Germany deliver to Spain 500 heavy machine guns,
50,000 rifles, 1,500 light and 100 75mm. guns.

Berlin agreed, but made

the delivery of the above material conditional upon the granting of
mining concessions to Germany.

This arrangement did not take final
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form until November.

German policy concerning further aid to the Spanish Rebels was
decided in Rome on October 28 in a conversation between Ribbentrop and
Mussolini.

Both agreed to continue sending supplies to Franco.

As a

result of this decision, German and Italian aid became quite extensive
during the months of November and December of 1938 and January of 1939■
^^Thomas, 553■

^^GFD., 753.
93ibid., 775.

51
30,000 tons of material entered the Rebel port of Vigo during December
a l o n e . D e s p i t e the increased aid to Franco, General von Richthofen
informed Goering that the Condor Legion would have to be tripled in order
for Franco to win the war.

Berlin did not agree and continued to follow

its policy of sending only war material and not troops to Spain.

The

Condor Legion was maintained at its present number according to Hitler's
November l8 decision.
The increased aid to the Rebels was a reversal of the direction that
German policy had taken towards Spain during the earlier stages of the
war.

After the implementation of the Italo-British agreement on November

1 9 3 8 ,9 5 and after the Munich conference, it was evident to Germany that

Britain and France would never go to war over Spain or anything for that
matter.

It seemed to Germany that the fears it earlier held concerning

the dangers of the Spanish war spreading into a European conflict were
groundless.

This opinion was also encouraged in the autumn of 1938 by

the Soviet Union’s change of policy towards Spain.

After repeated

attempts to affect a Russian-British-French alignment against Germany,
the Soviet Union was finally persuaded by the results of the Munich
conference that her interests would be better served by some sort of an
understanding with

G e r m a n y . 9^

As was the case with Czechoslovakia, so

it would be with democracy in Spain.

The Spanish Republic would be

sacrificed by the appeasement policies of British and French diplomacy
94

,

Bowers, 402,
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The condition for the agreement to come into effect was the with
drawal of Italian troops from Spain. 10,000 left in the autumn of 1938.

9^Thomas, 612-613-
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in order to prevent a general European war.
By January 3, the Rebel offensive against Catalona turned into a
rout with the collapse of the Loyalist defenses. For all extents and
purposes the civil war was now over.
With the end of the war in sight, Germany was anxious to withdraw
her volunteers from Spain.

Therefore on March 1, the Foreign Ministry

instructed General von Richthofen to inquire of Franco as to a suitable
date for the withdrawal of the German contingent from Spain.

Franco

replied that the Condor Legion could leave anytime after the first week
in May, for a victory parade was to take place in Madrid around that time.
In the meantime, Jbhannes Bernhardt was negotiating with the Rebel
government and Berlin as to the possibility of having Field-Marshal
Goering witness the embarkation of the Condor Legion.

This was done

without the knowledge of the German Ambassador Stohrer who, once informed
of these negotiations, cabled Berlin immediately protesting the activities
of Bernhardt and threatening to resign his post if the impending visit
was not arranged through normal diplomatic channels.

Stohrer added that

he had tolerated Bernhardt's Interference in the Embassy's relations
with Franco throughout the civil war for the sake of German unity of
purpose, but now must demand that this interference be stopped.
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The

Foreign Ministry supported Stohrer's position and on May 8 instructed him
to inform Bernhardt to leave all negotiations with Franco to the German
Embassy.

Stohrer was also to inform the Spanish government that he was

taking over all arrangements for Goering's visit.
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Further negotiations between Stohrer and Franco resulted in failure
to agree to the time and place of the proposed meeting between Goering
and Franco.

The whole plan was therefore cancelled and the Condor Legion

left Spain on May 22 without the presence of Goering.

On arriving in

Hamburg on May 31; the Legion proceeded to Berlin to be review on June 6
by Hitler.
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By the end of June the evacuation of German and Italian

military forces from Spain was complete.
The Condor Legion participated in almost every major action in the
war.

Its value to the Rebel forces was in its mobility and technical

precision.

The Legion was constantly being shifted from one front to

another in order to provide the Rebels with not only air superiority, but
with tactical support of the Spanish and Italian infantry.

Their parti

cipation in the war provided the German pilots with combat experience
and the opportunity to experiment with new tactics such as carpet
bombing and the use of incendiary bombs.
The principal activity of the German army in Spain was to train
Spanish officers and officer-material in the methods of modern warfare.
The German tank detachment that was sent to Spain under the command of
General von Thoma, trained Spanish officers in the use of tanks, anti
tank weapons and other technical machinery that was indispensable to a
modern equipped army.

The German army also established infantry,

artillery, mortar and engineer schools in which 56,000 Spaniards received
i n s t r u c t i o n . T h e German army was not far behind the Luftwaffe in

and

^^Katharine Duff, Survey of International Affairs, "The War in Spain
its Repercussions," Vol. I, (London, 1938), 355-357-
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experimenting with new tactics at the expense of Spanish troops and
civilians.

In particular, the Germans observed that concentrated tank

units were more effective against defensive positions than units which
were spread out in support of infantry.
German military aid to the Spanish Rebels was decisive for the
ultimate Rebel victory on three separate occasions.

The first being the

supply of transport aircraft in July of 1936 enabling Franco to airlift
his Moroccan troops across the Straits of Gibraltar.

Secondly, the heavy

supplies sent to the Rebel forces early in 1937 prevented the possibility
of a collapse of Rebel morale after having: failed to capture Madrid.
Thirdly, the arrival of German war material enabled Franco to launch his
successful Catalan campaign in December of 1938, thus providing the Rebels
with enough material to overcome the last defensive position of the
Loyalists.

This material arrived when both sides were exhausted from

the destructive battle of the Ebro and neither could, for lack of material,
initiate an extensive counter-offensive.

If German aid had failed to

arrive, the possibilities for a compromise peace would have been greatly
e n h a n c e d . T h e dependable and efficient men and material that Germany
supplied to Franco, enabled the Rebel forces to keep up a constant pressure
on the Loyalists who, for lack of a similar sourse of supplies, were
eventually overwhelmed.

b O l T h o m a s , 612.

CHAPTER II

GERMAN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT OF THE

SPANISH NATIONALISTS

THE NON-INTERVENTION COMMITTEE

1 9 3 6 -1 9 3 9

In addition to direct military and technical assistance, Germany
also supported the Spanish Rebels through diplomatic channels, the forum
being the London Non-Intervention Committee.

German diplomatic support

of the Rebels was not accomplished by singing the praises of the
Nationalist’s cause or by rallying around the Rebel banner but rather
by causing endless discussion and delay in the Committee and thereby
reducing its effectiveness.

The Committee's main concern was preventing

foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War, and various proposals
were introduced to accomplish this task.

Following the Italian lead,

Germany attempted to delay passage of any proposals which would limit
its ability to aid the Spanish Rebels.
Ey July 22, 1936, it was evident that the Spanish generals' attempt
at a coup d'état was unsuccessful.

The struggle in Spain evolved into a

civil war with each side appealing for and receiving large amounts of war
materials, from the interested European powers.

It was because of this

extensive aid to Spain, creating the danger of precipitating a European
war, that Fiance on August 1, 1936 issued an appeal to the interested
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powers for an immediate adoption of a common policy of non-intervention
toward the Spanish conflict.

At the same time, France announced that it

would retain its freedom of action concerning Spain pending the conclusion
of a non-intervention agreement.

1

The Spanish Civil War created not only a division in the French
cabinet but also a division of opinion among the French populace.

At

this time, the French government was a coalition government composed of
elements of the left, combined under the leadership of Leon Blum and
commonly referred to as the Popular Front.

The cabinet was divided

between the proponents of strict neutrality and those favoring aid to
the Madrid government.
in a similar manner.

Outside the cabinet, the French people were divided
Added to this internal division was the policy of

the British government under Stanley Baldwin.

Britain maintained its

traditional policy of avoiding European entanglements and thereby
leaving the French to face the consequences of any future French inter
vention in favor of the Madrid government.

The remaining, and in all

probability the best course of action left to the Blum government was
to have the major European powers agree to a policy of non-intervention.
The French note of August 1 proposed that an embargo be placed on
all arms, ammunitions and implements of war by each of the interested
states.

This embargo would also apply to contracts for military equip

ment entered into prior to the outbreak of the civil war.

The national

measures passed or decreed by each of the states, in fulfillment of the

^Puzzo.
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obligations assumed under the non-intervention agreement, would be cir-

2

culated among the states.

In a conversation on August 4 between the German Foreign Minister
Baron von Neurath and the French ambassador to Germany, François-Poncet,
Neurath stated that Germany did not need to make a declaration of neu
trality since it did not interfere in domestic Spanish affairs.

Germany

was willing to consider discussions on the possibility of preventing
intervention by foreign powers, provided that all the interested countries
3
join such an agreement--especially the Soviet Union.

On August 8, the

German government was again pressured to adhere to the French note.
This time it was by the British Ambassador to Germany, Sir Nevile
Henderson.

Again Germany delayed action by explaining the difficulties

of implementing such a plan and demanding that all countries with large
munition plants also participate.^
Germany continued to find excuses for not adhering to the French
proposal.

Up till August 9, its two main conditions for agreement were

that those countries with munition plants participate in the embargo of
war materials and that the Soviet Union also agree to join.

On August 9,

Spanish authorities at Badajoz seized a German Junker transport plane.
The German government not only used this as another excuse to delay
action on the embargo plan but also attempted to complicate matters
further by threatening to break off relations with the Spanish government

^Vera Micheles Dean, "European Diplomacy in the Spanish Crisis,"
Foreign Policy Reports, XII (New York, 1937), 225. Hereafter cited as FPE.
^GFD., 2 9 .
^Ibid.,

34.

if the crew and plane were net released.
In an effort to increase

the diplomatic pressure on Germany; the

governments of Britain and France transmitted to the German government
a joint declaration in which they agreed to ban export of war materials
as scon as similar declarations were made by Germany, Italy, Portugal,
and Russia.^

Germany replied that it agreed in principle to the embargo

plan but reiterated three conditions for accepting the plan as proposed
by the French.

1) The Spanish government must release the captured plane

and crew, 2) that all states possessing arms industries also join the
ban, and 3) that the Soviet Union also agree to accept the non-intervention
proposal.

Included in the German reply was the suggestion that the non

intervention proposals be extended to include volunteers.^

In order to quicken the diplomatic pace set by Germany, Britain
unilaterally announced the imposition of an absolute ban on war materials
exported to Spain.

The effect of the British conciliatory measure was

destroyed by the Spanish Loyalist's attack, seizure and search of the
German steamship Kamerun on August 19, contrary to international law.
By August 24, Germany was in danger of being blamed for sabotaging
the British-French attempts to affect an international agreement on the
non-importation of war materials to Spain.

Therefore on August 24, 1936

thy German government, in a note to the French embassy, formally agreed
to adhere to the French embargo proposal.
5
Esch. 5 6 .
^GFD., 44-45.
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The agreements on the embargo of war materials to Spain had the
effect of focusing international attention on the Spanish crisis.

Also,

in contradiction of traditional international practice, the embargo
resulted in the denial of the right of the legally constituted Madrid
government to purchase war materials on the world market.

This effect

prolonged the civil war by weakening the military position of the Spanish
government.

For Germany, the embargo act was a convenient screen behind

which German aid to the Spanish rebels was diplomatically hidden, while
aid to the Loyalist Spanish government was severely handicapped.
On August 2 9 , the French government proposed the formation of a

Non-Intervention Committee.

Its task was to keep the participating

states informed of the various measures that each of them implemented
in order to comply with the obligations undertaken in adhering to the
embargo agreement.

The representatives of each government on the Committee

were chosen from the respective embassies or legations currently ac
credited to the British government.®
The German government was suspicious that the Committee would
eventually become an organization with control powers and thus hamper
German aid to the Rebels.

Germany suggested to the French government

that the Committee be dispensed with, and in its place the offices of
the British government be used to inform the participating states of the
measures taken by'.each member in implementing the embargo agreement.
Also, the British government could receive the complaints concerning
violations of the embargo agreement.

®GF5., 63-64

German compliance was conditional
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on the question of how the proposed Committee would function and the
scope of its authority.

In an attempt to get the German government to

agree to the French proposal, the British and French gave assurances that
the Committee would not become a control agency with extensive powers.
In their efforts to get Germany to agree to the establishment
of a Committee, the British promised to eliminate the possibility of any
control authority that the Committee might assume.

This showed that the

British were more concerned with limiting the danger of the Spanish
conflict from becoming international in character than with prohibiting
the importation of war materials into Spain.

In order to placate Germany

and Italy, the western democracies avoided aiding the legitimate
government of Spain--a policy that was to lead to greater concessions
and eventually to World War II.
On September 5, the German government, unwilling to assume the res
ponsibility for defeating the French proposal, informed the British
Charge d'Affaires in Berlin that Germany accepted the proposal to establish
a Non-Intervention Committee in London.

Germany was confident that its

present level of technical and material aid to Franco would enable him

to achieve victory.

9

The German Foreign Ministry, in order to assure itself that the
Committee would not assume control functions, instructed its representa
tive on the proposed Committee to play a reserved role, to resist the
9
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^^The official German representative on the Committee was Joachim
von Ribbentrop, German ambassador to Britain, but the sessions of the
Committee were usually attended by Ernst Woermann, German Chargé d®Affairs
in Bri+ain
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Implementation of any controls, and to refer all matters to Berlin.
In its first session on September 9, and in subsequent sessions
throughout the month of September, the Non-Intervention Committee decided
upon its organization and procedure.

Mr. W.S. Morrison, Financial

Secretary of the British Treasury, was chosen temporary chairman.

On

September 21, he was succeeded by Lord Plymouth, British Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, as permanent Chairman.

The sessions of the Committee

were secret and at the end of each meeting a joint communique was issued

to the press.

12

A set of elaborate rules was adopted to deal with any alleged
violations of the non-intervention agreement.

Every complaint had to be

addressed to the Committee in writing and had to be from an official
source.

Thus reporters, journalists and travelers were excluded.

Once

received by the Committee, the complaint was communicated to the govern
ment accused of the violation.

The accused government would then supply

sufficient information to the Committee as to the veracity of the
accusation and the facts surrounding the alleged violation.
mittee would then Investigate the charges.

The Com

Unfortunately, it took an

immense amount of time for any complaint to go through this lengthy pro
cedure.

Once passed this complicated machinery the complaint ran into

a deadend, for there was no provision for the application of any type of
sanction against the violating government.

^^GFD., 78 -8 1 .
^^GFD., 1 8 2 -1 8 4 .
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The Committee was merely a
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debating society that agreed to do nothing more than review the facts
and evidence of each

complaint brought before it.

The financial obligations of the Committee were met by contributions
14
from its members.

The major powers of France^ Britain, Germany, rtaly

and Bussia contributed proportionately larger amounts than the lesser
powers. As in similar international organizations, the Committee was
in constant financial difficulties because of the lack of contributions.
A sub-committee was established principally to assist the chairman
in the day-to-day work of the Committee, but eventually it came to assume
the powers of an executive organ of the Committee.

Its members included

France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Russia, Portugal, Belgium, Czechos
lovakia and Sweden.

Because of its procedure, the sub-committee could

accomplish little without involving a long period of time.
From October to December of 1936, one of the main concerns of the
Committee were the Russian complaints of German violations of the

embargo agreement, and its subsequent threats to withdraw from the
Committee.

During this same period, the British attempted to negotiate,

both Inside and outside of the Committee, for an observation and control

system that would supplement the embargo agreement.

Outside of the

Committee, the German recognition of the Franco regime threatened to
handicap efforts to establish the international policy of non-intervention

towards the Spanish conflict.
lb

Countries adhering to non-intervention: Albania, Austria, Belgium,
united Kingdom, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Nether
lands, Norway, Portugal, Rcumania, Sweden, Turkey, Switzerland, Czechos
lovakia and Poland.
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At the October 23 meeting of the Committee, Russia threatened to
withdraw from the Committee if German and Italian aid to the Rebels
continued.

However, Russia softened its position somewhat by stating,

after diplomatic representations by London, Paris, and Prague, that it
would not be bound to the non-intervention agreements to any greater
extent than the other participating powers.

15

Thus the Russian threat

to break up the Non-Intervention Committee and thereby create the
possibility of greater foreign intervention in Spain was solved by
diplomatic means outside of the Committee.
Since October, the members of the Committee had been aware of
repeated violations of the embargo agreement by Italy and Germany and
to a lesser extent by the Soviet Union.

In an attempt to deal with

these violations, the British government introduced in the sub-committee
a plan calling for the posting of foreign observers in Spanish ports
and along Spanish borders.

The Committee on December 2 agreed to have

the plan presented to the two Spanish factions, requesting their approval.
At the same time, the sub-committee was instructed to examine the
feasibility of prohibiting the entrance of volunteers into Spain.

The

question of volunteers became acute because of the increased rumors that
composite units of the German and Italian armies were being sent to the
assistance of Franco.
Germany reacted to the British plan by informing the British govern
ment that despite the fact that Germany had introduced a measure con
cerning volunteers during the discussions on the arms embargo earlier

^^FER., XII, 2 3 0 .
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that year, it was willing to agree to any proposal which would strengthen
non-intervention.

Agreement was on the condition that all members of the

Committee participate.

Repeated British and French notes to the German

government caused Germany to reply that neither the question of volunteers
nor the enforcement of the embargo accord should be discussed outside the
committee.
Germany also emphasized that discussion of volunteers could only
take place in conjunction with other forms of indirect intervention-that is, financial aid.

IT

Germany's reasons for hesitating to reply to

the continual British and French efforts to conclude an agreement were
primarily because of the military situation in Spain.

During December

Franco, with his combined southern and northern armies, failed to capture
Madrid because of the increased volume of Russian war materials arriving
in Madrid, plus the arrival of a considerable number of international
volunteers. A German agreement to the ban on volunteers at this time
would seriously hamper the rebel war effort and damage the international
prestige of the Fascist powers who publicly sided with the Rebels.

Both

Germany and Italy continued to assist the Rebels in order to counteract
Russian aid.
The increased flow of war materials to Spain led Britain and France,
on December 27, to communicate a joint note to Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and
Moscow.

The note stressed the danger of increased aid to Spain as a

threat to international peace.
IT

18

Germany and Italy interpreted the

GFD., 1 6 7 .
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British-Erench note as an attempt to maintain the superiority of the
Madrid government over the Rebels.

19

To forestall any immediate action

on the question

of

volunteers, Germany suggested to Britain

andFrance

that the London

committee study the possibility of removing all foreign

volunteers from Spain. On December 31, Neurath told the British and
French Ambassadors that although Germany was willing to localize the
conflict, it would never tolerate a
The German

jure recognition

Communist Spain.

20

of the Franco regime on November l8

struck a damaging blow to the efforts of the British and French to
arrive at some sort of working agreement to establish an international
policy of non-intervention towards the Spanish conflict.

De jure

recognition meant not only that the France regime became a member of
the community of nations but that Germany was legally within its rights
to aid France if the non-intervention agreements failed.

German re

cognition created the impression among the European powers that the
Fascist states, in backing a Franco victory, would risk the possibility
of a confrontation with the Soviet Union--Loyalist Spain's principal
supporter.

Thus, with both Spanish parties being recognized as the

legitimate government of Spain, both the Soviet Union and the Fascist
states could claim that they were helping a legally recognized government
to defeat a rebel uprising.

Such an attitude was precisely what the

British and French, through the Non-Intervention Committee, were attempting
to forestall.

^^GFD., 194 -1 9 6 .
^°Ibld.
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The new year opened with the German seizure of three Spanish ships
on January 3, 1937 in retaliation for December 24 internment of the German
steamer Palos by the Loyalist government.

German policy, in light of the

Loyalist actions against German vessels, was to intensify the raids on
Spanish ships but not to take stronger action.
In the Non-Intervention Committee, the British observation and
control plan was still being debated while war materials continued to
be shipped to Spain in an ever increasing volume and number.

Again the

British and French endeavored, by diplomatic means outside of the
Committee, to keep the Spanish conflict from spreading.

"On January 9,

the British government urged immediate national prohibitions upon
recruiting of volunteers for Spain, and the assimilation of the vol
unteering problem to the program of observation and control being worked
by the Committee.

..."

21

Germany was willing to consent to the ban on volunteers provided
that an effective control system be adopted at the same time and the other
members of the Committee also agree to the ban.

Germany informed Franco

of its attitude on January l4 and advised him to accept the control and
observation scheme in principle but to stipulate certain conditions which
would delay its enforcement.
On January 27, conversations between Goering and Mussolini took
place in Rome.

There was mutual agreement that Italian and German replies

to the British note of January 9 be identical and express that both
governments were willing to support the British proposal to stop volunteers

21
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from entering Spain.

Both Goering and Mussolini agree that France was

sufficiently supplied with war materials to enable the Axis powers to

22

cooperate with Britain and France.

In the meantime. Franco's negative reply to the British observation
scheme called attention to the fact that any attempts to establish
control observers on Spanish soil would be a limitation of Spanish
sovereignty.

This reply had the effect of forcing Germany and Italy,

in replying to the British note on January 2 5 , to state that they were
in full agreement with the British proposal, but not with the proposal
to place international observers on Spanish soil.

The reply also stated

that the two governments already created the necessary legislation pro
hibiting the departure of volunteers to Spain.

This legislation would g,_

into effect as soon as an effective system of control was agreed upon.
They again referred to their proposal to withdraw volunteers already
in Spain.

23

On March 8, the London committee reached agreement on the extension
of the embargo to include volunteers.

The members of the Committee also

agreed to set up a land and sea observation patrol around Spain in order
to enforce the embargo on volunteers and war materials.

The purpose of

the observation scheme was to provide a system by which all attempts to
ship arms, ammunition and volunteers to Spain would be observed and
reported to the Committee.

^^Malcolm Muggerridge (ed.), Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, (London,
Hereafter cited as Ciano.

1 9 ^8 ), 8 5 .
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To administer the observation scheme, the Committee created an Inter
national Board composed of representatives from Britain, Prance, Italy,
Russia, Norway and Poland.
of the Netherlands.

Chairman of the Board was Vice-Admiral Dulm

The International Board appointed administrators

and deputy administrators, plus a corps of observing officers.

The

observing officers included I 30 for the French-Spanish border and five
for the Gibraltar-Spanish border, plus 550 for ship observation.

The

Portuguese-Spanish border was administered by 13 O British observers.
The 550 ship observers mentioned above were part of the merchant vessel
observation plan.

This plan required all vessels flying the flag of

the countries participating in the Committee to stop at any of twelve
designated ports outside of Spain and embark two observation officials.
The duties of these officials included ascertaining as to whether or net
embargoed goods were aboard the ships bound for Spain.

2k

Complementing the land and merchant vessel observation schemes was
the naval patrol.

Its members were Britain, France, Italy and Germany.

Ships under the specific authority of their respective states patrolled
the Spanish coasts from a distance of ten miles. Patrol zones were
established in such a manner as to have German and Italian ships patrolling
the coasts held by the Loyalists and the French and British ships patrol
ling the coasts held by the Rebels.
To finance the control scheme, the Committee created an internati: nsl_
fund subscribed to by all the members of the Committee.

The International

Board administered the fund through an accounting officer appointed by

^^Padelford, T7-79'
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the Non-Intervention Committee.
The main failure of the scheme was that the control authorities could
not stop the flow of contraband and volunteers into Spain 'but could
only warn the violators of the national measures of each country against
such actions.

The only way a violator could be punished was to have the

observation officials submit a report to the International Board describing
the violation.

The International Board would then submit the report to

the Committee^ which would communicate the charges to the proper govern
ment.

The government of the individual who caused the violation would

prosecute the violator in accordance with the laws of that state.

The

government would then report the actions it had taken to the Committee.
This was a long and complicated process that, in the final analysis,
depended upon the goodwill of the government involved and its ability
to verify the facts of the violation.
The embargo on war materials and volunteers did not include either
Spanish combatants or states that were not signatories to the non-inter
vention agreements.

Ships flying the flags of these states were not

required to embark observers or comply with the regulations of the naval
patrol•
On April 7, 1937, the observation and control system went into effect.
Because of the numerous methods of circumventing the system, both Spanish
combatants continued to receive foreign assistance.

Germany and Italy

continued their aid to Franco in an attempt to strengthen his forces
for the final attack against Madrid.

^^Padelford, 77-79-

They were convinced that enough aid
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had reached Franco to enable him to overcome the Loyalist forces.

They

could; therefore, subscribe to the observation and control plan without
endangering the rebel military position.
The next major problem confronting the Non-Intervention Committee
was the question of withdrawing volunteers already in Spain.

The question

was previously brought up by Germany during the negotiations of 1936
concerning the embargo act and the ban on volunteers.

Now, however, the

British brought up the question during the March 1, 1937 meeting of the
Committee.

Previously, Britain and France had ignored the German proposal.

Now, it was the turn of the German and Italian representatives to evade
and delay the question.

Because of the Italian defeat at the hands of

the Loyalist forces in the battle of Guadalajara, Italy would not con

sider the question of withdrawing volunteers until it restored its
military prestige.
Another factor influencing Germany and Italy to follow obstructionist
tactics was that in the spring of 1937 Franco was in the midst of his
campaign to conquer the northern provinces of Spain and needed the German
air power of the Condor Legion and the Italian troops.

This was especially

true since the majority of the Rebel forces was concentrated around Madrid.
From March to May of 1937, German and Italian delaying tactics
effectively blocked diplomatic negotiations concerning the withdrawal
of volunteers.

On March 20, Neurath informed Sir Nevile Henderson that

Germany would proceed with discussions on volunteers only if the question
of the Spanish gold being shipped to Russia would also be

25 GFD., 254.
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Late in March, the German ambassador to Great Britain, Ribbentrop,
informed the German Foreign Ministry that if the Rebels could not win
without foreign assistance, gaps could be found in the observation system
in order to reinforce Franco. Ribbentrop believed that France would do
nothing without the backing of Britain, and Britain was too preoccupied
with peace and containment to force a showdown over the violation of the
supervision and control plan.

26

On May 17; the British asked Germany if it would be willing to
participate in approaching both parties in Spain with the view of
reaching an agreement to an armistice in order to withdraw the foreign
27
volunteers.

The German reply suggested that the question of withdrawal

would perhaps have a better chance of success if pursued in the London
committee.

It appeared to Germany that the success of a mediation plan

was highly unlikely.

28

The Deutschland incident abruptly interrupted attempts to achieve
agreement over the withdrawal of volunteers.
German 'pocket' battleship Deutschland

On May 29, 1937, the

was bombed by Loyalist aircraft

while it lay at anchor in the harbor of Iviza.

29

The battleship was a

participant in the naval patrol, but at the time of the attack, it was
off-duty.

The crew suffered twenty killed and seventy-three wounded.

Berlin sent immediate instructions to the German Embassy in Great Britain
to the effect that, "the Reich Government will hence forth not participate

GFD., 292 .
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Iviza is one of the Balearic Islands
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in the patrol or In the deliberations of the Non-Intervention Committee
until it obtains a positive guarantee against a repetition of such
i n c i d e n t s . S h o r t l y thereafter, the German navy, in :retaliation shelled
the Spanish port city of Almeria.
In reply to British fears that the German bombardment of Almeria
might lead to an expansion of the.Civil War, Neurath stated that that
would depend upon Britain, but as far as Germany was concerned the
Almeria incident was the extent of German retaliation.
Now that Germany and Italy had withdrawn from the naval patrol,
one-half of the system of supervision and control was in danger of
collapsing.

In order to meet this emergency, the British and French

governments, with the approval of the Soviet Union, proposed that they
take over the patrol duties in the vacated German and Italian zones.
Germany and Italy refused to accept this offer and in return suggested
that the naval patrol be dispensed with altogether by granting belligerent
rights to both Spanish parties. The Axis considered the impartiality of
the British and French in the naval patrol as questionable.

Since 1936, the German and Italian governments continually had
attempted to persuade the other powers to recognize a state of belliger
ency in Spain.

With the status of belligerents, both parties in Spain

would have the right to establish blockades.

This would make the Linden

committee and the embargo agreements unnecessary.

Although used by

Germany as a delaying and obstructionist tactic, the granting of
belligerency did have some validity in international law.

^°GFD., III, 297 .

The recognition
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of belligerency implied a position of neutrality by the recognizing
state.

Therefore, if the powers of Europe extended belligerent rights

to the Spanish parties, this would be the same as declaring a position
of

neutrality and as such would supercede the London committee. But a

state was not required to extend belligerent rights automatically as
soon as an insurgent reached a definite position in relation to the
established government.

The extension of belligerency laid solely in

the hands of the individual states and could therefore be used as an
instrument of foreign policy.

The British were not about to extend

belligerent rights to the Rebels,because this would give legal sanction
to interference with foreign shipping on the high seas.

In British

opinion, this could only lead to a widening of the war and the danger
of starting a European conflict.
By mid-summer of 1937, Franco was, with Italian assistance,
exercising belligerent rights in the Mediterranean.

The naval patrol

broke down with the withdrawal of Germany and Italy.

The system of

land control was also threatened as Portugal suspended frontier control
31
and the French announced they would do likewise.
In an effort to insure the safety of foreign warships participating
in the naval patrol and to bring Germany and Italy back into the com
mittee, the British government on June 3 proposed a series of guarantees
to the German Foreign Ministry for its approval.

The guarantees included

a pledge to be given by both Spanish parties to respect foreign warships

^^Esch., 87.
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and to designate safety zones in Spanish ports for fueling bases fcr
patrol vessels.

Failure to Implement these assurances or interference

with patrol ships by the Spanish combatants would be the subject of
consultation between the four naval patrol powers.
In the ensuing talks between Britain and Germany^ it was agreed cn
June 12 that in case consultation failed Germany would retain her free
dom of action in inflicting reprisals for unwarranted attacks upon any
of her patrol vessels.
British proposal.

Germany accepted the other three parts of the

It was also decided that Germany and Italy would re

turn to the Committee and to the naval patrol after joint communication
of the agreement to the Spanish parties.

Without waiting for a reply,

Germany and Italy resumed on June 16 their membership in the patrol
32
scheme and the Committee.
On June 17, the Spanish ambassador informed
the German Foreign Ministry that Franco intended to give his approval
to the guarantee for naval patrol vessels in Spanish ports.
Four days after the settlement of the Deutschland incident on June 15

33

n

and 18 the German cruiser Leipzig was allegedly attacked by a submarine.,'"
On the same day, the British ambassador to Germany received nctificati. n

from the German Foreign Ministry of the cancelation of Weurath*s impending
trip to London.

The German excuse was that the attacks of German war

ships in the Mediterranean necessitated the Foreign Minister's presence
in Berlin.

In the meantime, Germany demanded action by the f ur naval

patrol powers under the June 12 agreement to consult in the event .f am "t,-r

^^GFD., 326 -3 2 7 .
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attack on a naval patrol vessel.

The German government was anxious to

come to an immediate understanding as to the joint measures to be taken
in retaliation to the attack.
At first the German proposals included an immediate naval demon
stration by the four powers off the Loyalist coast, surrender of a,11
submarines, and a warning to the Loyalist government that further attacks
34
would be dealt with by military reprisals.
Because of the British and
French rejection of any retalitory measures until an inquiry could be
made, Germany modified its demands to include only the naval demonstration.
By June 23, no agreement was reached in the Four Power Conference.

There

fore in accordance with the agreement of June 12, Germany notified the
control powers of its decision to recover freedom of action and tv. with
draw from the naval patrol.
cipation in the Committee.

Germany would, however, continue

its parti

German and Italian withdrawal from the naval

patrol limited the patrol's authority and efficiency to such an extent
that throughout the summer of 1937 incidents of piracy increased in the
Mediterranean.

This had the effect of forcing the British and French

governments to take action.
On September l4, the states having interests in the Mediterranean
met at Fyon, Switzerland and agreed upon an anti-piracy contre! plan.
Germany and Italy were invited but did not attend.

The purpose of the

Nyon agreement was to eliminate attacks on merchant and war vessels
operating in the Mediterranean.

Because of the Nyon agreement,, which

was similar to the functions of the naval patrol, Britain and France

34
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withdrew from the patrol in September.
facet of the control scheme.

The naval patrol was only one

The remaining merchant vessel observation

scheme continued to operate throughout the civil war, but with less
efficiency.
During the Deutschland and Leipzig incidents the British government
continued to press for an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign volun
teers from Spain.
tactics.

The Fascist states continued to follow obstructionist

In the June 22 meeting of the Committee, the British repres

entative proposed that Britain be empowered to negotiate with both
Spanish parties in order to reach an agreement on the equal withdrawal
of volunteers from both sides.

The Soviet Union defeated this proposal

by demanding that a porportlonate withdrawal from both sides take place.35
Germany and Italy followed similar tactics in respect to the with
drawal question.

Both avoided taking a stand on withdrawal by stating

that the decision to withdraw volunteers must be left up to the Spanish
governments.

The German representative in the Committee was instructed

by the Foreign Ministry to follow the lead of the Italian representative
in obstructing withdrawal.

The tactical problem confronting Germany

and Italy was how to delay passage of a withdrawal agreement while
placing the responsibility somewhere else.
July

France was considering the advantages of reopening the

Pyrenean frontier in order to aid the Spanish Loyalists but was restrained
35
GED., 362-364.
36

German policy was to let the Italian representative take the lead,
thus assuring against the possibility that Germany might be blamed f r
obstructing the progress of withdrawal.
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by Britain.

The British attitude was at this time disposed towards the

concluding of some sort of plan for the withdrawal of volunteers, and
37
the opening of the Erench-Spanish border would destroy these efforts.
Because of Franco's northern campaign, the Loyalists badly needed the
aid that France could give them if the Pyrenean border was reopened.
Despite British pressure, both France and Portugal withdrew the
international observers from their borders.

The only part of the ob

servation scheme that remained was the merchant vessel system which
required all ships bound for Spanish ports to embark neutral observers.
In order to remedy this situation, the British government introduced
on July l4 a compromise plan in the London committee.

This plan included:

1) retention of placing neutral observers aboard ships going to Spain
and restoration of control of land frontiers, 2) replacement of the naval
patrol by neutral observers in Spanish ports and in Spanish airdromes,
3) withdrawal of volunteers and a commission to be sent to Spain to
arrange and supervise the withdrawal, and 7) recognition of the bel
ligerency of both parties when withdrawal was substantially underway and
on the condition that both parties:

a) recognize as contraband only

those articles whose shipment was prohibited under the non-intervention
agreement and any others that might be designated by the Committee and
b) agree not to molest ships carrying neutral observers or to interfere

with neutral shipping not engaged in traffic with Spain.

38

On the same

day the committee authorized the British government to discuss points

3?GFD., 396 .
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one, two and three with the Spanish parties.
During the remaining months of 1937, the London committee concerned
itself with the efforts to negotiate the terms of the British compromise
plan and to arrive at a solution.

In response to the British plan, the

German Foreign Ministry instructed its Committee representative to
accept the British proposal as a basis for discussion, but German policy
was to remain vague and general.

The German representative was not to

give the impression that Germany would accept the withdrawal of volunteers
prior to the granting of beligerent rights. 39
German stratigy throughout these discussions over the British plan
was to delay and obstruct any agreement until Franco had sufficiently
built up his forces for the planned spring offensive on the Aragon front.
Germany was sure that the blame for delaying the withdrawal could be
placed on the Russians.
The Non-Intervention Committee, while debating the British proposal,
received the Dalm-Hemming report on means for restoring and improving the
control system.

The report recommended that the naval patrol remain

dissolved and that a system of observers be placed in various Spanish
p o r t s . A month later, on October 2, the Soviet Union took the position
that the entire supervision and control system would be meaningless without
the naval patrol.

Any further participating in the Committee cn its part

was conditional on the existence of an effective control system.

3^GFD., 420.
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Inability to reach an agreement over the British plan centered
around the three points of symbolic withdrawal^ belligerent rights and
the attitude of the Soviet Union.

Germany and Italy used all three in

order to avoid being blamed for obstructing the progress of withdrawal.
In the October 17 session of the Committee, the French representative
introduced a plan somewhat similar to the British proposal.

This plan

was also defeated by the German use of the Soviet Union's attitude.
It was Germany's tactic to insist that the Soviet Union participate
in any withdrawal plan by demanding that any agreement must be unanimous.
In this way, Germany would not be blamed for delaying the progress of
the Committee.
The German position on the three points under discussion in the
Committee wp,s revealed in the October l8 instructions to the German
ambassador to Great Britain.

Germany favored symbolic withdrawal of a

limited number of volunteers on an equal basis from each side.

The bar

gaining number could start at 3,000 men, but the type of volunteers
withdrawn must be left up to the Spanish parties.
was interpreted as being only an experiment.

Symbolic withdrawal

If it proved successful,

then a larger number of volunteers could be withdrawn
amount of debate.

after a limited

There was no German objection to the renewal of the

non-intervention pledges as proposed in the French plan.

The instructions

further stated that once symbolic withdrawal was concluded, the problem
of belligerency must be given priority.

k-2

Thus Germany reversed its

previous stand that belligerent rights must be granted prior to any
iiP
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withdrawal.

Both positions were tentative and could be changed or

altered according to the tactical position that Germany wanted or needed
to assume.
Progress in the Committee was now blocked by the disagreement over
which of the withdrawal plans, the British or the French, should be
discussed first.

Italy, with reluctant German support,

cussing the British plan first.

I3

favored dis

The Soviet Union regarded the policy

of non-intervention as a failure and rejected any responsibility .for
its continuation.

This was precisely what Germany and Italy wanted in

order to shoulder Russia with the major responsibility for any failure
of withdrawal.
In the October 22 session of the Committee, a joint draft of the
British and French withdrawal plans was introduced.

At the same session

all the states, except France and Russia, favored setting the tentative
number for symbolic withdrawal at 1,000.

Difficulties arose over the

date of restoration of control measures and whether the commissions
or the Committee would decide on the definite number of volunteers to
be withdrawn.
Germany was not as yet ready to agree to a definite plan on the
withdrawal of foreign volunteers from Spain.
having non-intervention fail.

Nor was it interested in

As far as Germany was concerned, a further

gain of time would probably result in the improvement of Franco's military
position, and this in turn would create an advantageous situation for
43

Germany thought that a more conciliatory stand should be taken,
so as not to incur any responsibility for delay.

81
Germany in the Committee.

With this in mind, Germany was ready to support

symbolic withdrawal on the condition that belligerent rights be granted
kk
as soon as this partial withdrawal was completed.

This was a tactical

measure intended to cause delay, since the French demanded that bel
ligerency be accorded only after all volunteers had withdrew from
Spain.
Now that Germany and Italy accepted the British-French compromise
plan in principle, the technical difficulties and minor points needed to
be clarified.

Also some sort of agreement was necessary on what the

Russian responsibility would be if it did not agree to the withdrawal
but remained in the Committee. Germany was not willing to force a failure
of the British plan over Russian non-participation.

In order to eliminate

the possibility of assuming the blame of any such failure, Germany
dropped her demand that all powers participate in the withdrawal and
the recognition of belligerency.

In its place was the new demand that

safeguards for the Russian non-participation be included in any with
drawal plan.
On November 4, 1937, the Committee adopted a resolution accepting
a compromise solution based upon the July l4 British plan.

The chairman

of the Committee, Lord Plymouth, was authorized to present the plan to
both Spanish parties in order to secure their approval.

The plan con

tained provisions to send two commissions to Spain with authority to
estimate the total number of foreigners to be withdrawn and to make
arrangements for their evacuation.
44
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Control measures were to be ..
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re-established and strengthened just before the commencement of the
evacuation process.

Belligerent rights were to be granted only after

a substantial number of volunteers had been withdrawn.

45

The draft

proposal also provided that safety measures would be taken to fill the
gap caused by the Russian non-participation.
The London committee continued to work out the composition and
powers of the commissions to be sent to Spain while awaiting the replies
of the Spanish parties.

In the meantime,the German government urged

Franco to respond favorably to the Committee's plan,but to impose
certain conditions.

46

Franco agreed to do so.

The Committee received the Spanish replies by the middle of December.
While both parties accepted the plan in principle, they made many
conditions and expressed important reservations as to its practical
application.
In the Committee, negotiations continued to be bogged down over the
problem of the composition and powers of the two commissions.

Other

points of disagreement and inability to compromise were the questions
involving substantial withdrawal and belligerent rights.
As the year 1937 came to a close, the Committee was still negotiating
the details of the withdrawal plan which was accepted in principle by
the participating states and the Spanish parties.

Important points had

yet to be agreed upon, and it would take months of negotiation before
any compromise could be reached.
45
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While the Committee continued its discussions, Franco prepared his
forces for the spring offensive.

He continued to receive large shipments

of material and troops from Germany and Italy.
aid to the Loyalist forces.

Russia also continued its

The Committee had been in existence for one

and one-half years and its successes, besides helping to localize the
Spanish conflict, were negligible.
At the start of the new year there was still no agreement on the
actual number of volunteers that would constitute the "substantial with
drawal" upon which depended the granting of belligerent rights.

Franco

was of the opinion that belligerent rights should be granted after 3,000
men were withdrawn equally from both sides.

This was the position taken

by the German representative after Germany and Italy conferred on January
l8< over the common policy to be adopted in the Committee concerning the
withdrawal question.
Proportionate withdrawal from both sides was also being discussed
in the Committee. On January 11, 1938, the Committee authorized Lord
Plymouth to enter into private and informal talks with the representatives
of the major powers in order to arrive at a compromise solution.
On January 20, the German Chargé d'Affaires in Great Britain sent
a telegram to Berlin outlining the dilatory policy that Germany had
followed during the previous year. Woermann included in his report a
brief résumé of German-Italian cooperation in the Committee.

The co

operation of the two countries presented a united front unchallenged
by any other similar group.

According to Woermann, the Soviet Union

had isolated itself because of its inability to cooperate with Britain
or France.

By introducing the question of belligerent rights, Germany
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had held up the progress of the Committee indefinitely without assuming
the responsibility for the delay.

Woermann predicted that the date for

the implementation of the withdrawal plan would be sometime after May
but that Franco still had it in his power to cause further postponement.

4T

In January, the Rebel military forces suffered a setback when the
Loyalists won the battle of Teruel.

The German Foreign Ministry notified

its embassy in Britain to use obstructionist tactics in order to delay
48
further agreement on withdrawal.

In the meantime, German and Italy

further assisted Franco in building up his forces to counteract the
present Loyalist military advantage.

This increase of foreign troops in

Spain jeopardized the German position in the Committee.

In order to give

at least a semblance of cooperation, Woermann suggested to Berlin that
Germany agree to the British proposal for placing observers in Spanish
ports.
The German War ministry disliked the British plan for control officers
in Spanish ports but agreed not to oppose it.

Their opinion was that the

naval patrol interfered with German aid to Franco.

The Foreign Ministry

reassured them that supplied could still reach Spain on ships flying
the flags of countries not represented in the Committee or on ships flying
either of the Spanish flags.
The renewal of submarine attacks in the Mediterranean forced Britain,
France and I t a l y t o

,

increase supplementary safety measures to those

562.
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Although Italy was not an original signatory to the Nyon agree
ments, later she did agree tc participate in the anti-piracy measures.
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agreed upon during the Wyon Conference.

These measures provided that

submarines submerged in the patrol areas of the Mediterranean would be
attacked.

On February 8^ the German government protested the British

action as being a. unilateral declaration without binding legal force.
Since the German naval forces were not affected, Germany took no further
action .50
Agreement was finally reached In the Committee on the question of
how many volunteers would be withdrawn before granting belligerent
rights.

All the members, except the Soviet Union, agreed upon the

figure of 10,000.
number.

The Soviet representative demanded 20,000 as a basic

This Soviet attitude stalled the progress of the withdrawal plan

and enabled Germany and Italy to not only blame Russia for the delay
but also to continue assisting the Spanish Rebels.
Again the question arose as to when the control system, suspended
since July of 1937, would be restored.

Germany and Italy wanted It

restored as soon as the commissions arrived In Spain.

France demanded

restoration only after the beginning of actual evacuation.
The military situation in Spain, In March of 1938, placed the
London committee In a somewhat

awkward position.

The Rebel forces

under General Franco had recaptured Teruel and were driving towards the
Mediterranean coast in an effort to divide the Loyalist territory In
half.

The Committee was now faced with the possibility of an early

Franco victory.

If this oceured, neither the withdrawal plan nor the

^OçFD., 582.

Committee itself would be necessary.51
Germany had no fear that the Condor Legion in Spain would be
included in the withdrawal, since a Franco victory would eliminate the
need for implementing the withdrawal plan.

If unforeseen events pro

longed the Rebel victory, Germany could count on Franco to reject the
withdrawal plan or at least to make conditions that would delay its
implementation.

Therefore, on June 17 Germany informed the Committee

that it would accept the British plan in its entirety.
The British compromise plan was to go into effect 4-5 days after its
acceptance by the two Spanish parties.
mately ll8 days.

It was to be completed in approxi

Belligerent rights would be granted as soon as 11,000

volunteers were evacuated from the side with the smaller number of foreign
volunteers.

The control system of 1937 would be re-established--minus

the naval patrol.

In place of the patrol, international observers were

to be placed in twelve designated Spanish ports.

The agreements of 1936

and 1937 were also to be re-affirmed by the members of the Committee.

52

Germany and Italy, after having accepted the withdrawal plan,
immediately set out to coordinate their positions and to advise Franco
of their intentions.

In his reply to Berlin and Rome, Franco objected

to the British plan because it involved interference with Spanish
sovereignty and left nationalist Spain with only partial belligerent
rights.
On August 16, the London committee received Franco's reply to the

., 639'
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British plan.

The Spanish Rebel government accepted the idea of

withdrawal and that 10,000 volunteers be withdrawn but refused to accept
the idea of proportionate withdrawal.

Franco demanded that belligerent

rights be granted prior to the withdrawal and objected that observers
in Spanish ports constituted a limitation on Spanish sovereignty.
Germany believed Franco's reply to be perhaps a little too negative and
would probably cause considerable difficulty in the Committee.^3
Faced with the negative Spanish replies, the Committee did not
convene to consider the Spanish objections to the British plan.

To do

this would have involved more months of detailed discussions before any
agreement could be reached.

Besides that, any future compromise plan had

no greater certainty of success than the recently defeated plan.

By

this time the Czechoslovak-German crisis surpassed the Spanish affair in
importance.

Because of this new crisis, there was no serious effort

to overcome the Spanish objections.
54
On September 21, 1938, Premier Negrin

of the Spanish Loyalist

government appealed to the League of Nations to appoint a commission to
oversee the implementation of the Loyalist's decision to withdraw all
foreign volunteers.

By October, all foreign volunteers fighting for the

Loyalist's cause were withdrawn.

Fearing that he would be held res

ponsible for obstructing a withdrawal. Franco on October 15 allowed the
departure of 10,000 Italian troops from Rebel t e r r i t o r y . F r a n c o thought

^^GFD., 730,
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Prime minister of Spain, 1937-1939-

that this would being about the recognition of his status of belligerency
by the European powers.
In the meantime, Eranco, during an interview in Burgos, informed
the Secretary of the Non-Intervention Committee, Francis Hemming, that
"the Spanish Government put no value whatsoever on a continuation of
the sessions of the Non-Intervention. . . ."56

Hemming returned to

London on November l4 and reported that the withdrawal plan in its present
form had no chance of success.

A new plan could only succeed only if

Franco was granted belligerent rights from the very start.

57

In December of 1938, the Committee was in danger of becoming dis
solved.

The system of supervision and control of embargoed goods to

Spain had been suspended and efforts to re-establish the control system
and to effect the withdrawal of foreign volunteers had been rejected by
the Spaniards.

To all extents and purposes, there was nothing further

for the Committee to do unless it was willing to tolerate many more
months of prolonged discussions and disagreements.
Germany however was not willing to let the Committee dissolve.
It provided a convenient base for Germany's diplomatic support of Franco
and also preoccupied French and British foreign policy.

To keep the

Committee alive, Germany demanded that belligerency be granted to Franco
and that the Committee continue to work on a withdrawal plan acceptable
to both Spanish parties.

,

780.
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Because of the rapid progress of Franco's military forces in
1939,^^ the member states of the Committee concentrated not so much
upon inducing Franco to part with his foreign troops but upon the
question of whether those volunteers would leave Spain as soon as the
civil war was over.

In this respect the British government was satisfied

by Hitler's Munich statement and Mussolini's assurances in connection
with the 1938 Anglo-Italian agreement.
/

persuaded.

The French were not so easily

They demanded a guarantee from Franco that his future

foreign policy would not be anti-French.

In the spring of 1939, Franco

assured the French that Spain would not follow a policy hostile to France.
Neither the Non-Intervention Committee nor its sub-committee had
held any formal sessions since July of 1938 when the British plan for
withdrawal of volunteers had been accepted in principle.

Thereafter,

the discussions on the details of the plan had been conducted through
private interviews between the Committee members and the chairman.
Although the activities of the Committee had been suspended throughout
the latter phases of the civil war, the Committee did not dissolve
itself until April 20, 1939— one month after the Rebel occupation of
Madrid.
Germany did not officially withdraw from the Committee until April
20 but announced at the end of March that it would not continue making
payments towards the cost of the control system.
Throughout its entire existence, the London Non-Intervention Com
mittee succeeded in focusing international attention upon the Spanish

^^Franco's forces had reached the coast and were advancing on
Barcelona.
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Civil War.

This was contrary to its avowed purpose of limiting the

influence and affect of the civil war on international relations.

Its

declared purpose of prohibiting the exportation of war materials and
volunteers to Spain was only an excuse to cover up its real intention of
attempting to prevent the danger of the civil war becoming a European
conflict.

Thus the Committee was willing to overlook repeated violations

of the non-intervention agreements by Germany and Italy^ if these
violations did not endanger the efforts to localize the civil war.

The

Committee was successful in localizing the conflict, but in order to do
so it compromised its authority and efficiency.
The Committee itself had no legal justification for its existence
other than the national legislation of the member states implementing the
obligations assumed in agreeing to follow a policy of non-intervention.
In other words, the effectiveness of the Committee depended on the good
will of its members in following a specific course of action for an
unlimited amount of time.
Any violation of the non-intervention agreements was not contrary
to international law since the agreements did not have the same legal
authority as a treaty or formal international agreement.

However, such

an organization as the Non-Intervention Committee could compel a
government to comply, at least publicly, to various agreements.

If a

government was unwilling to do so, it ran the risk of incurring public
disapproval.
Germany was well aware of the risks it ran in following obstruction
ist tactics in the Committee and in violating the non-intervention
agreements.

This was the reason why so much emphasis was placed upon
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the attempts to shoulder the Soviet Union with the responsibility of
delaying the progress of the Committee.

Germany was following a double

policy of publicly cooperating with the policy of non-intervention while
privately sending assistance to the Spanish Rebels.
As far as Germany was concerned, the Committee provided a splendid
opportunity to prolong the civil war by aiding the Rebels and to tie
down the British and French foreign offices, it then could exercise
less diplomatic restraint in central Europe.

CHAPTER III

GERMAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
WITH NATIONALIST SPAIN

1936-1939
Since the advent of industrialization in Spain in the early
twentiety century, a major part of the Spanish economy has been con
trolled by foreign capital.

Although Spain was not in need of capital,

it did need the technical knowledge necessary to exploit its vast mineral
resources.

In many respects, Spanish industrial development by 1936

was simply a branch of the advanced industrialization of western Europe.
"Spanish capitalism was in a significant measure but European capitalism
in Spain.
Spanish mineral deposits so attractive to foreign capitalists
included copper, silver, pyrites, bauxite and potassium.

Seventy per

cent of the world's mercury supply was mined in Spain, and Basque iron
and coal deposits also contributed to the mineral wealth of Spain.

To

many people, foreign control of important Spanish mining and industrial
enterprises was a matter of considerable importance.

This was especially

true in the case of the British, who owned and operated the Rio Tinto
mines, Spain's largest copper deposit.
With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July, 1936, many
countries with large investments in Spanish industry became vitally

1
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concerned over the future of those investments.

On the other hand, states

with little or no investments in Spain looked upon the civil war as an
opportunity to acquire certain raw materials necessary for the production
of armaments.

Acquisition could be accomplished by providing one or the

other of the Spanish combatants with war material and demanding in return
the export of certain vital raw materials.

The availability of Spanish

ores was assured by the need of each Spanish combatant for arms, ammuni
tion, planes, tanks, technicians and troops.
Their initial success placed the Rebels in control of the mines of
Huelva and Spanish Morocco, the agricultural produce of the Canary Islands
and the abundant crops of Andalusia.

The campaign of 1937 brought to

Rebel control the Vizcayan iron ore deposits and heavy industry and
the coal fields of Asturias.

Being thus able to control much of Spain's

mineral resources was a great advantage to the Rebels, since the export
of mineral and agricultural raw materials became one of the major ways
of financing the war.

In addition to the export of wine, cork, oil,

minerals and other products, the Rebels financed their war effort through
private contributions, forced conversions of foreign securities into
bonds, and credits.

By January 1937, fTve months after the start of

the civil war, the Rebel government owed a debt of l80 million dollars.
Most of the debt was for war material imported from Germany.

In return,

the Nationalists shipped large quantities of iron ore and other raw
materials to Germany under various barter and credit arrangements.

Sept. 6, 1937, 18-19.

94
To handle the German . aid program to Spain and the Spanish exports
to Germany in payment for the deliveries of war material, two holding
companies were established in July 1936 under the direct supervision of
Hermann Goering.

Rowak, Rohstoffe-und-Waren-Einkaufsgesellschaft, was

the German holding company which handled all purchases of war material
destined for Spain and all imports of Spanish raw material into Germany.
As Co-ordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange, Goering was in
direct control of Rowak.

3

Working under Goering was Major von Jagwitz,

chief of the Auslandsorganisation^ s foreign office, who was later to
become State Secretary in the Economics Ministry.

k

To operate the

machinery of the German aid program, the entire foreign office of the
Auslandsorganisation was at Goering's disposal.
Hisma, Compania Hispano de Marroqui de Transportes, managed the
necessary commerical transactions such as procurement and supply at the
Spanish end of the German operation.

Johannes Bernhardt, formerly a

clerk for the Wilmer Brothers Company, a German export firm in Spanish
Morocco, was named director of Hisma.

Bernhardt had married Fraulein

Wilmer and settled down as manager of the Wilmer Brothers branch office
in Tetuan, where he had cultivated the friendship of Spanish officers
stationed there.

When the civil war broke out, he was thus in an

opportune position to act as an intermediary between the Spanish Rebels
and the Nazi party and to garner a large personal fortune as director of
3

Friedrich Bethke was the administrative director of Rowak and
departmental head in the Economics Ministry.
il

GFD., 111.

95

Hisma.^

As early as August 2, Hisma ferried Rebel troops across the

Straits from Morocco to Spain and was soon active in the Spanish economy.
By 1937; Bernhardt’s interests Included several companies operating in
Spain besides Hisma, grouped under a new holding company, Solflndus,
Sociedad Financiera Industrial
Penetration of the Spanish economy by German capital was an important
consideration in the determination of German policy towards Spain.
Hitler, in a speech at Wurzburg on June 27, 1937; stated that the reason
for German intervention in Spain was the need to acquire Spanish iron
ore.

r

Germany also needed mercury, zinc, and copper for its rearmament

program.

These raw materials would be readily available if there was a

Fascist regime in Spain, and thus German economic officials preoccupied
themselves with arranging various commercial agreements, trade conces
sions and treaties with Nationalist Spain throughout the civil war.
From 1937 to 1938, German exports to Spain increased by 46 million
Reichmarks, while imports totaled approximately 10 million Reichsmarks

8
monthly.
of zinc.

The imports included 25, 5°3 tons of copper and 13,167 tons
9

German efforts to acquire economic concessions from the

Spanish Nationalists throughout the civil war finally paid off in 1939
when the Franco government granted mining concessions to Germany.

^Puzzo, 58 -5 9 6
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The basic economic policy towards Spain that Germany followed through
out the civil war was first sketched in a report from Spain by Eberhard
Messerschmldt, representative of the German Export Cartel for War materials.
After touring Spain for two weeks in the autumn of 1936 interviewing major
German officials, including Bernhardt, and inspecting the operational
facilities of Hisma, Messerschmidt reported to Berlin that the delivery
of German war materials to the Rebels was a Hisma monopoly.

Messerschmidt

was especially critical of Bernhardt for not demanding compensation from
Franco for German aid.

"it is obvious that Bernhardt has tailored the
„10

whole organization to fit his personal pattern.

It was Bernhardt

however who took the initiative in getting German aid to Franco and in
implementing the aid program.

According to Messerschmidt, this had been

necessary in the first stages of the German aid program, but now it was
expedient to negotiate with the Rebels in order for Germany to receive
some return on its gifts . Messerschmidt recommended that Germany be
aware of its future interests in Spain while Franco was still dependent
upon German aid.

Germany would find itself empty handed if it did not

pressure Franco for pledges concerning future German economic and
political influence in Spain.

There was a need for a basic German-Spanish

treaty which would outline what raw materials Spain was to deliver to
Germany and what German manufactured goods it must buy in return.

11

Because of Messerschmidt's penetrating analysis of the German aid
program and his recommendations for future German policy in Spain, the

^°GFD., 8 5 .
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Intelligence Department of the War Ministry found it. necessary to call
in all copies of the report.

The Messerschmidt report received additional

confirmation on November 2k in a telegram from the German embassy at
Seville to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin.

The telegram described the

urgent necessity of devising some sort of arrangement enabling the Rebels
to pay for German war deliveries and by which German economic interests
would be safeguarded after the end of the civil war.

There was the

danger that Britain and France might surpass Germany in granting credits
to Spain after the civil war if some sort of German-Spanish agreement
was not concluded.
The Economics Ministry, having received requests from Nationalist
Spain to send representatives for negotiations on a trade and clearing
agreement, attempted to regularize the trade in raw materials between
Germany and Spain.

Evidently the Ministry was unaware of the existence

of the holding companies Rowak and Hisma.

The Franco government was

probably as equally confused over the lack of coordination in Berlin.
The Spanish request was more than likely be:ause of the Rebel desire
to solve the problem as to which German agency they should deal with
concerning the German aid program.

Since the outbreak of the civil war,

the Rebel authorities had dealt with the Nazi party through the
Auslandsorganisation.

It was through the latter agency that Spanish

representatives received the first German, aid. and it was through
Bernhardt, a member of NSDAP that German aid continued to reach the
Rebels.

Now they were confronted with the officials from the Economics

^^GFD., 137-139 .

Ministry.

Clearly something had to be done or the entire aid program

11
would suffer.
On October 16; State Secretary Kuerner of the Four Year Plan
briefed the Economics Ministry on the existence of Rowak and Hisma and
the functions of the two holding companies in regulating the trade in
raw materials between Spain and Germany.

Koerner explained that Rowak

and Hisma were limited to trade in raw materials only and that their
authority did not extend to either the Canary nor the Balearic Islands.
Both companies held a monopoly of purchases and sales.

A German ex

porter who wished to export goods to Spain was required to sell them to
the German firm, Rowak. A fleet of merchant ships, protected by the
German navy, would then deliver the goods to Spain where they were
resold to Hisma.
firm.

The goods were then marketed in Spain by the Hisma

To finance the operation, the Finance Ministry granted 3 million

Reichsmarks of credit to Rowak. Hisma obtained similar credits from the
Spanish Rebel government.
The Economics Ministry was surprised upon learning of the exist
ence of the German aid program to Spain under the direction of the
ÏÏ5DAP.

Since the program was already operative, the Economics Ministry

took no initiative of its own other than attempting to expand the
Hisma-Rowak monopoly to commercial trade under the operation of private
business interests.

The crux of the problem was the antagonism between

the Nazi Party and the official agencies cf the German government.

13
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This

was particularly evident when the Spanish representatives first approached
Germany for aid.

The contacts between the Spanish Rebels and German

officials were established through the offices of the foreign organization
of the Nazi Party.

Spanish attempts to acquire aid through normal

diplomatic channels encountered the cautious conservatism of the German
Foreign Ministry.

Ey using the Auslandscrganisation, the Spanish were

able to expedite matters and negotiate directly with Hitler and Goering.
Most German officials who favored aiding the Rebels encouraged this
indirect approach through the Party apparatus as a necessary precaution
against any unwanted publicity.
The influence of the Auslandsorganisation in matters dealing with
the Rebel government was due to its vast network of economic and political
agents recruited from the large number of Germans residing in Spain.
This formula for furthering German interests was repeated in other
countries as well as in Spain.

Agents of the Auslandsorganisation worked

independently of the German Foreign Ministry, whose embassies and
legations abroad usually followed a more cautious policy.

The Auslands

organisation agents promoted export of foreign goods to Germany, supplied
commercial information to Germans residing in foreign countries, obtained
control of local raw materials, and in general locked after German for
eign interests.
1937 was an important year for laying down the basis of German-

Spanish economic relations along the lines cf the Messerschmidt Report.
Various protocols and agreements between 'Germany and Spain attested to
the German desire to establish a definite foundation for acquiring
Spanish ore and maintaining a dominant r l.e in the economy of Spain after
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the civil war.

These agreements provided an outline for future German-

Spanish economic cooperation which eventually led to concrete agreements
on the extent of German penetration of the Spanish economy.

Delay,

misunderstanding and fear of other foreign investors supplanting German
economic interests, characterized the German efforts to secure a position
of superiority in order to exploit Spanish mineral resources and invest
in the future development of the Spanish industry.
On December 23, 1936 the Economic Policy Department of the Foreign
Ministry instructed the German ambassador to the Rebel government to
approach the Rebels with the view of taking up negotiations to adapt
the March 9; 1936 German-Spanish trade agreement to meet present con
ditions.

The new treaty was to contain provisions indicating the readi

ness of both parties to conduct trade relations with each other on a
favorable basis as possible and to insure preference in the supply of
goods of special interest to the two parties
The Spanish Nationalist government agreed to the proposal in a
German-Spanish protocol on January 1, 1937 and suggested that the
negotiations be started not later than April 1, 1937-^^

The German

officials in Berlin, including Hitler, were interested in speeding up
the impending negotiations for fear that imminent shipments of large
units of the Italian army to Spain might tend to lessen German influence
with F r a n c o . A l t h o u g h Germany was willing to cooperate with Italy for

^^GFD., 1 7 9 .

^^ibid., 199-200.
^^^bid., 2 1 9 .

101
the sake of closer Italo-German relations,it was not ready to sacrifice
its economic interests in Spain.
talks scheduled

The German delegation to the economic

for the last week in January was led by Geheimrat Wucher,

an experienced negotiator from the Finance Ministry.

Von Jagwitz

represented Rowak: on the delegation.
On January 28, Bernhardt reported to the Foreign Ministry that in
the last six months most of the German deliveries to Spain were without
payment.

The payments the Rebel government made were in goods or small

amounts of foreign exchange.

The Rebels used most of their foreign

exchange to buy supplies from countries other than Germany.

Bernhardt

recommended that the Rebels be asked to apply all their foreign exchange
exclusively to the purchase of German materials.
The major topic under discussion among German officials in Berlin
from February to May, 1937, while economic negotiations continued be
tween Germany and Spain, was whether or not the Hisma-Rowak monopoly
of all German purchases and sales in Spain should be continued.

Both

German and Spanish export interests wanted the restoration of normal
commercial relations.

This involved substituting a clearing agreement

in place of the Hisma monopoly.

A number of other countries had already

concluded such an agreement with the Nationalist government, and Germany
risked the possibility of losing the Spanish market if it did not do
the same.

On the other hand, Hisma succeeded in placing Germany ahead

of other countries in Spanish trade and directing raw materials
primarily to Germany.

The pressure needed to stop Franco from selling

materials to other countries for foreign exchange could be applied by
Hisma because of its great influence with the Rebels.

The Foreign
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Ministry and Field Marshal Goering supported the Hisma-Rowak monopoly,
while President Schacht of the Reiehshank and the Finance and Food
Ministries were in favor of replacing Hisma with a clearing agreement.
By May, the German officials in charge of the aid program to Spain
decided not to negotiate a clearing agreement with the Nationalist govern
ment but to continue the Hisma-Rowak monopoly.

General Franco was to

be consulted for his views on a clearing agreement.

If he insisted on

such an agreement, Germany was prepared to conclude a partial clearing
agreement but only on the condition that a guarantee be given by the
Rebels that the transactions in raw materials and essential foods be
IT
reserved for the Hisma-Rowak firms.
In the meantime, German-Spanish economic negotiations reached an
impasse over the Rebel delegation's demand for a clearing agreement to
reopen private trade relations.

The Foreign Ministry instructed Stohrer

to inform Franco of the impassee and to ask for (his) position on the
matter.

On May 21, Franco replied to the German representation by

stating that he did not attach any importance to a clearing agreement
at this time and that the Rebel delegation overstepped its authority

18

in pushing for such an agreement.

Delays, criticisms of the Hisma monopoly, and complaints by private
German and Spanish business interests held up the signing of the
economic agreements.

The Nationalist government informed Stohrer that

the inadequate facilities and organizations of the Spanish agencies

. , 87-85

^^Ibid., 2 9 3 ,
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created a situation in which the negotiations involved a longer period
of time to be concluded than was originally thought.^9
On July 12^ 15 and l6_, protocols were signed between Jordana,

20

representing the Nationalist government, and Stohrer, representing the
German government.

These protocols signified the successful conclusion

of the economic talks that had been going on for the past few months
between Germany and Nationalist Spain.

The protocol of July 12 stated

that a more comprehensive settlement of economic relations between Spain
and Germany was postponed for the present.

Spain promised to conclude

its first general trade agreement with Germany with unrestricted mostfavored- nation treatment.

If Spain attempted economic negotiations with

a third party, it would inform Germany before any agreement was reached.
In the July 15 protocol, Germany and Spain agreed "to assist one another
to the greatest possible extent in the delivery of such raw materials,
foods and semifinished and finished goods as are of particular interest
21
to the recipient country.""

On July l6, Spain agreed to pay its debts

to Germany in Reichsmarks at a four percent annual interest.

Partial

payment of the Nationalist debt would be by the export of certain goods
and minerals from Spain and Spanish Morocco of vital interest to Germany.
Also, the Nationalist government would provide funds to Germany for re
investment in Spain.

Germany received the opportunity to participate

^9GPP., hOJ.
Count Francisco Gomez Jordana.
(1 87 6 -1 9 ^^ )• President of the
Junta Técnica, 1938. Vice-President and Foreign Minister of Spanish
Nationalist government, 1938-1939-

^^GFD., 417 .

io4
in the future economic reconstruction of Spain,especially in mineral
22
resources and other raw materials.
The July protocols were considerable economic concessions to Germany.
If the Spaniards could be taken at their word, Germany would have a
significant amount of control over the economy of Spain in the future,
Events were to prove that the Nationalist government interpreted the
July protocols in a slightly different manner than did Germany.
On October 9; the Spanish Nationalist government issued a decree
suspending for the present all
property.

transactions of and titles to mining

Also, all titles, leases, sales and purchases of mines or

mining property acquired after July l8, 1936 were declared null and
void.

23

The decree was a setback to German businessmen in Spain who

attempted to secure control of Spanish mines in order to guarantee a
continuous supply of raw materials to Germany.
involved, were agents of the Hisma company.
field included the Montana project,

2k

The German businessmen

Hisma activities in this,

which was an attempt to bring about

German control of five mining companies operating in Spain.

On October

12, Bernhardt protested to General Jordana and General Franco that the
decree of October 9 adversely affected Hisma’s efforts to secure German
participation in the Spanish mining industry.

Bernhardt also complained

that the Nationalist decree was not in the spirit of the July protocols.
The Nationalists gave indefinite assurances that the decree was not
^^GFD., 421-422

23ibid., 45724.Montana companies: Aralar, Compania Explotadora de Minas S.A.,
Tolosa, capital stock of 25 million pesetas; Cia, Minera Santa Tecla S.A.,
Vigo, capital stock of 12 million pesetas; Montes de Galicia, Orense,
capital stock of 16 million pesetas; Sierra de Gredos, Salamanca, capital
stock of 8 million pesetas; Montanas del Sur, Seville, capital stock of
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directed against German interests but rather against the possibility of
the Loyalist government's granting economic concessions to foreign

interests— especially to the Soviet Union.
Hisma*s views be put in writing.

Jordana requested that

This was done, but Jordana was still

evasive and gave the impression that the Rebel government was not anxious
to discuss the question at this time.

Neither Hisma nor the German

embassy was satisfied with the Rebel's actions, particularly since they
viewed that the decree of October 9 as directed against Germany.

Stohrer

and Bernhardt considered a direct appeal to Franco in order to clarify
the situation.

25

In the meantime, the German Foreign Ministry informed Stohrer on
October 16 that the Spanish Rebels intended to enter economic negot
iations with Britain.

Any agreement with a third party was potentially

dangerous to German preeminence in the Spanish economy.

The German-

British competition in iron ores and copper made these impending

26
negotiations all the more worth watching.

Stohrer was instructed to

keep the Foreign Ministry informed of the course of the Anglo-Spanish
talks and to intervene to protect German interests if they seemed
directly menaced.^7

On October 24, Stohrer replied that Nicolas Franco^^

^^GFD., 4 9 6 .
^&In the summer of 1937,the Nationalist government took over con
trol of the Rio Tinto mines and the mining facilities of Bilbao. Germany
and Britain constantly pressured the Nationalists for mining rights in
these two areas. The British were especially concerned with maintaining
their controlling position in the Rio Tinto mines.
^7 g FD., 461.
28

Nicolas Franco:
(189 I)■ Brother of General Franco, head of
General State Secretariat (political department)of the Span. Nat. gov.
Later Ambassador to Portugal.
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and Chef de Cabinet Sangronlz

29 assured hlm that economic questions were

not discussed with the British.

The talks entailed only the conclusion

of a consular agreement involving the exchange of semi-official missions
between Nationalist Spain and Britain.
By October 1937, Spanish Nationalist debts for the delivery of German
war goods totaled 70 million Reichsmarks.

In addition to the debt for

German deliveries, Stohrer, in a memorandum dated October 25, stated that
the German property damage in Spain amounted to another 90 million Reichs
marks.

Stohrer went on to say that the embassy was aided by the foreign

agencies of the NSDAP in organizing and aiding the German colony in Spain.
So far, cooperation between official German agencies and the Nazi Party
was very effective.

Again the problem of the Hisma monopoly prompted

Stohrer to write that Spanish opposition elements were growing and should
be carefully considered for their influence on future German-Spanish
economic relations.

31

Germany's economic aims in Spain involved penetrating into the main
sources of Spanish wealth, i.e. mining and agriculture.

The Montana pro

ject constituted the whole aim and purpose of German exploitation of
Spanish mineral resources.

If the Nationalist government did not consent

to the German demands then Germany would apply stronger measures than
mere negotiations in order to reap sufficient rewards for its assistance
to the Spanish Rebels.
^José Antonio de Sangroniz Y Castro:
(1895- )• Chef de Cabinet
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nationalist government. Later
Ambassador to France and Italy.

30gfd., 478.
3^ I b i d . , 480.
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Germany was also concerned over the possibility that the Rebels would
grant economic concessions to Britain at the expense of German mining
interests in Spain.

Goering was particularly irritated on hearing rumors

that because of the Hisma-Rowak monopoly Spanish economic interests
contemplated opening up negotiations with the British in order to estab
lish stronger economic relations between the two countries.

To counter

act this possibility, Goering favored sending a representative to
Salamanca to "hold a pistol to General Franco's b r e a s t . J a g w i t z
calmed Goering down by suggesting that the German ambassador be instructed
to.make representations to Franco expressing deep concern over the
security of German interests in Spain.

Bernhardt, who at this time was

in Berlin, agreed with the suggestion.
On November 27, Stohrer undertook the demarche with Franco in the
interest of mining concessions and against Anglo-Spanish agreements
detrimental to Germany.

Stohrer also asked Franco for a binding pledge

of protection for a list of concessions already held by H i s m a . T o
further strengthen Hisma's bargaining power with the Nationalist govern
ment, Goering, on November 30 appointed Bernhardt the official representative of the Four Year Plan for economic questions in Spain.

34

On December k, Franco denied rumors of Spanish economic concessions
OC
Britain "as pure fabrications."
32

GFD., 5 0 8 .
Ibid, 511-

34

Ibid., 5 1 6 .

35ibid., 522.

He promised to consider the list of
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mining concessions demanded by Germany.
not satisfy Berlin.

However, Franco's assurances did

On December 13, the Foreign Ministry instructed

Stohrer to continue pressuring Franco on the subject of economic con
c e s s i o n s .

In a subsequent meeting between Bernhardt, Stohrer and Franco

on December 20, the German representatives were told that the German
demands needed time to be examined.
of the judicial and legal situation.

There must also be a clarification
To accomplish the clarification.

Franco proposed that a mixed commission be created to make an expert
study of the legal situation and try to come to an understanding.

The

commission would be composed of members of the Junta Técnica, Hisma and
the German embassy.

37

What alarmed the Nationalist government was Germany's method of
acquiring numerous mining rights without announcing its intentions or
consulting the Rebels about future purchases.

Jordana informed Stohrer

that difficulties between Germany and Nationalist Spain were unnecessary
and could be avoided if Germany would only give the Impression that it
desired to cooperate with the Nationalist government.
Various conferences, inspections and collections of data involving
technical and legal questions of the Montana affair were in operation
by the second week of January between representatives of the Junta
Técnica and the Rowak-Hisma firms.

In a conference on the Montana

project between officials of the German embassy and the Hisma company
on January 10, 1938, "it was agreed that all materials suitable for

^^GFD..> 528.
3?lbid., 538.
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answering any objections which the Spaniards might still raise would be
examined and assembled at once."

38

In the meantime, it was decided that

undue pressure would not be exerted on the Junta since various Hismaowned mines were continuing to operate with the consent of the Rebels.

39

German officials in Berlin were particularly anxious that the
economic talks proceed rapidly in order to secure from General Franco
a guarantee of mining rights in Spain.

Germany was not prepared to

accept the Nationalist's limitation of twenty-five percent foreign owner
ship of Spanish companies.

The German embassy was therefore instructed

to watch closely further developments in Spain which might influence
German economic interests.
The Nationalist government continued to find reasons for delaying
the conclusion of any definite economic agreement with Germany, especially
concerning German interests in Spanish mineral resources.

Both Stohrer

and Bernhardt attempted at every opportunity to push and expedite the
settlement of the Montana affair but were repeatedly confronted with
Spanish excuses for delay.

In response to the continual German represen

tations, Jordana expressed on February 10 the view that Spain was
anxious to cement friendly and close ties with Germany in the economic
field, but changes in government and administrative delays prevented an
early settlement.

4o

German strategy involved couching its demands for

38 GFD., 5 4 9 .

^^On January 21, Bernhardt reported to Berlin that ore shipments
from Spanish Morocco and Nationalist Spain to Germany during December
1 9 3 7 , amounted to 2 0 5 ,0 0 0 tons of iron ore, 55,000 tons of pyrites and
152 tons of tungsten, copper and bronze. Total imports of Spanish ores
during the entire year totaled 2,584,000 tons. (GFD , 565)-

4o
GFD., 586.
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economic concessions in terms of cooperation, historical ties and common
enemies, while avoiding the impression that it merely wanted economic
rights in Spain as compensation for services rendered in supplying the
Spanish Rebels with war material.
Franco finally took the initiative and on March 19 ordered the
hi
newly created Council of Ministers
mining rights in Spain.

to decide the question of German

The council decided to initiate studies with the

view of replacing the October 9, 1937 law with a general decree applic
able to all foreign powers and which allowed room for granting special
rights to the Axis powers.

However, the proposed decree would enable

the Spanish government to grant or refuse changes of ownership in Spanish
mines.

On April 6, Stohrer protested to Franco that the proposed law was

unwise and unjust.

In its place the German ambassador recommended that

the Nationalist government issue a general mining law which would give
Germany much more freedom of action in acquiring mining rights than the
decree of the Council of Ministers.

h2

Hitler reserved for himself the decision as to the amount of financial
claims that Germany would make on the Spanish Rebel government for the
delivery of war materials.

43

Originally, it was decided that the Rebels

would pay for these supplies on a cash basis.

This was not done because

the amount of German aid exceeded the Spanish ability to pay in foreign

^^In February, 1938, the Nationalists formed a regular cabinet with
Franco as President of the Council. Jordana was Vice-President.
42
GFD., 637.
^^Ibid., 648.
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exchange and raw materials.

As of March 31, 1938, the Nationalists

paid only 4$ million Reichsmarks of the total 338 million Reichsmarks of
the Wehrmacht's expenditures for men and material in Spain.

44

In partial

payment of the debt. Franco released some 10-12 million Reichsmarks for
reinvestment by Hisma in Spain.

At the time, Hisma was demanding that

Franco grant 90 million more in credit for the German investment in Spain.
On May 31, Stohrer was still attempting to exert influence on Franco
and the Council of Ministers as to the final draft of the proposed decree
that would replace the law of October 9, 1937-

To support the German

case, Stohrer recommended to the Foreign Ministery that a demarche be
made with the Spanish ambassador in

B e r l i n .

^5

The new Spanish mining law was signed on June 6, 1938, before
Stohrer had an opportunity to discuss with Franco what form the law
would take and to what extent German economic interests in Spain would
be safeguarded.

Jordana explained to the enraged German ambassador that

the new law increased foreign participation in mining rights from twentyfive to forty percent, with the possibility of further increasing the
percentage in special cases.
act toward Germany.

Stohrer considered the law as an unfriendly

But in his report to Berlin, Stohrer was not as

outraged as he had been with the Spanish Foreign Minister.

"The result

is by no means pleasing or gratifying, even though the new law . . .
seems acceptable to our interests."

^^GFD ., 648.
^^Ibid; 6 6 7 .
^^Ibid., 675-
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The Spaniards seemed to act as if

112
the promises they made to respect German economic interests were not
entirely in good faith, since the method of passing the new law was
similar to a fait accompli. Wot only had the Rebels failed to inform
the German officials of the proceeding of the Council of Ministers,
but had denied the German Ambassador permission to see General Franco
prior to the promulgation of the new law.
Despite the Spanish method of passing the new law, the Germans
were not entirely disappointed with it.

In Bernhardt's opinion, the law

offered the possibility of acquiring 100^ control of Spanish mining
interests in special cases.
the 4o^ could be avoided.

Because of dummy companies and personnel,
"In the final analysis we have thus probably

achieved substantially what we had to achieve from the standpoint of our
interests and what we could demand in consideration of the claims of
other countries . . . and Spain's understandable desire to safeguard
hY
her own interests." '
On October l8, the German Economics Ministry recommended to the
Foreign Ministry that further German aid to the Spanish Rebels be con
ditional upon prior guarantee by the Nationalist government of German
control of the Montana companies.

The next day Jordana told Stohrer

that payments to the Montana project of sums owed to Germany were approved
by the Nationalist government.

This slight concession by the Rebels had

the effect of paving the way for greater German control of Spanish
mineral resources.
By this time, Berlin was becoming more and more apprehensive over

^?GFD., 687.
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the lack of Spanish cooperation in guaranteeing the participation of
Therefore, on November 7 the Foreign

German capital in Spanish industry.

Ministry instructed Stohrer to inform Jordana that new material to
Nationalist Spain was conditional upon Rebel acknowledgement in precise
figures of past deliveries of war material and expenses of German per
sonnel and equipment incurred while in Spain.

The new material was

also conditional upon a decision by the Council of Ministers as to
whether or not it would permit more than 40% German ownership of various
mining companies in S p a i n . T h e reasoning behind the German move was
that the shipments to Spain of war material and the maintenance of the
Condor Legion caused a considerable burden on the German rearmament
program.

Germany, as a consequence, needed raw material and foreign

exchange.
On November 19, Stohrer notified Berlin that the German conditions
were acceptable to the Nationalist government.

The Spaniards were also

willing to firmly orientate themselves politically and economically
toward Germany after the civil war.

4g

Ly March 11, 1939, the approaching end of the civil war suggested
to Germany the need to arrive at some sort of commercial treaty with
Nationalist Spain in order to settle the Rebelt debt to Germany for
deliveries of war material, to guaranteeofuture ore deliveries, and to
enable Germany to play a major role in the reconstruction of the Spanish
economy.

German ambassador Stohrer advised Berlin that because of the

^^GTD.., 784.
fulfillment of the German wishes, the Nationalist government
granted to Germany an Increase of German capital to 75^ in three of the
five Montana mining companies, and to 60% in the other two.
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Increased competition of Britain, France and the United States negoti
ations with the Rebels should be initiated as soon as possible.

The

Hisma-Rowak monopoly should also be reevaluated in order to conciliate
German and Spanish private commercial interests.
The Nationalist government also desired to clarify Germany's role
in reconstruction and future trade with Spain.

On March 15, the Spanish

Minister of Commerce suggested to Stohrer immediate discussions for the
purpose of arranging a settlement of the outstanding German-Spanish
economic questions.

In view of reports of an imminent Loyalist surrender,

the German Foreign Ministry accepted the Spanish offer with a sense of
urgency.

The delegation^^ named for the economic talks with Spain was to

approach the Nationalists with a friendly and cooperative attitude and
to avoid at all cost any impression of competing with the Italians.
Germany gave the impression publically that the Italians were partners,
but privately they were regarded as economic competitors in Spain.
In the preliminary negotiations lasting from June 12 to July 5 in
Burgos, the Spaniards appeared cooperative but seemed uncertain as to
what form German-Spanish economic relations would take in the future.
The Nationalist government was prepared to negotiate the German claims
on war debts, which now totaled 500 million Reichsmarks.

53

The Spaniards

also expressed a desire for a clearing agreement in place of the HismaRowak monopoly.

In repayment of the war debt, Germany expected yearly

^°GFD., 863.
5^Sabath, Counselor of Legation in Spain; Bethke, of the Economics
Ministry; Koenning, of the Finance Ministry.
, 895.

^^Ibid., 892.
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Imports in the sum of 250 million Reichsmarks or more.
of these imports would be specified by Germany.

Fifty percent

The Nationalists were

also expected to provide funds for the Solfindus investments, which would
54

be subtracted from the total war debt.
Despite the fact that the negotiations for a general German-Spanish
economic agreement dragged on into World War II, Germany still received
extensive compensation for its aid delivered to the Spanish Rebels
throughout the civil war.

Because of its continual pressure on the

Nationalists for economic concessions during the civil war, Germany was
able by 1 9 3 9 j> to exert a strong influence on the future development and
direction of Spanish trade and economic reconstruction.

Despite the

Nationalist's victory over the Loyalists, the Rebel government was still
unable to establish a working, sound economy without German assistance,
because of the destructiveness of the civil war.

Because of the German

penetration of the Spanish economy, the Nationalists were unable to con\

elude extensive trade agreements with Britain, France or the United
States in order to escape the economic grasp of Germany.

Thus Germany

received ample economic compensation for its material and technical
support of the Rebel forces.

As a consequence, traditional British-

Spanish and French-Spanish trade declined.
Germany's political relations with Nationalist Spain were not as
successful as its economic relations.

It was not until March 1937 that

The Solfindus company with its headquarters in Salamanca, was
mainly concerned with exporting to Germany wools, skins, ores, metal,
agricultural products and resin products. Solfindus controlled the
Spanish and German dealers and firms which previously arranged the
purchase and export of the above material.
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Geriüany made any attempts to clarify its future political relations with
Spain.

At this time, the Spanish Nationalist government and Germany

concluded a secret protocol at Salamanca.

Both governments agreed to

consult each other on measures necessary to defend themselves against
the threat of communism.

They also agreed to consult one another on

questions concerning international policy which affected their joint
interests.

Neither party would enter into agreements directed against

its treaty partner or assume any other position than benevolent neutrality
if either party was attacked by a third party.
The next German attempt to bind Spain closer to the Berlin-Rome
Axis without involving the obligations of a military alliance was on
April 6, 1 9 3 8 , when Ribbentrop advised Hitler on the necessity of con
cluding a political treaty with Spain along the lines of the protocol
of 1937-^^

Hitler was not enthusiastic over this type of treaty and

requested that the Foreign Ministry delay approaching Franco for the
time being.
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The Foreign Ministry delayed consideration of the treaty with the
Spaniards until May, at which time it instructed Stohrer to sound out
Franco as to the attitude of the Nationalist government concerning such
a treaty.

Jordana and Franco approved of the treaty but informed the

German ambassador that they wanted it to remain a secret.

The Spaniards

feared that a German-Spanish political treaty at this time would hamper

^^GFD., 256 -2 5 7 .
^^Ibid., 6 3 1 .
57ibid., 6 3 4 .
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the British efforts for a rapproachment with Nationalist Spain, especially
since the British were pressuring the French government to stop its aid
to the Loyalists in an effort to create a positive atmosphere for the
British-Spanish talks.

Spanish reasons for delaying the treaty did not

mean a rejection of the treaty but merely an effort to guard against
unpleasant international repercussions detrimental to the Nationalist
c a u s e . O n May 31, 1938, the German Foreign Ministry notified Stohrer
that a secret treaty was of no value to Germany at this time and that
negotiations should be delayed until a more opportune moment.

59

There

matters stood until December 1938, when Germany renewed its efforts to
conclude a German-Spanish political treaty.
By the end of February 1939, negotiations reached a successful
conclusion with Franco's approval of the text of the German-Spanish
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Treaty of Friendship.

On March 31, the treaty was signed at Burgos.

It contained approximately the same articles as Ribbentrop's April 1938
draft treaty, with the exception that the treaty would remain in force
for five years and if not rejected six months prior to expiration, it
would continue for another five years.^
In the meantime, German-Spanish relations suffered a slight setback.
During the Czech crisis of September 1938, after representations by
Britain and France, Franco announced that in the event of war Spain would

^^GFD., 664.
59

Ibid., 660.

^°Esch., 1 5 8 .
^^GFD , 884.
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declare its neutrality.

In order to offset any possible German protests,

62
Franco intended to address a letter to Hitler on the question.

On

September 28, Woermann, Under State Secretary in the German Foreign
Office, informed the Spanish ambassador that Germany understood the
Spanish position but expected Nationalist Spain not to negotiate this
question with Britain or France and also expected Spanish benevolent
neutrality towards Germany in the event of a European conflict.
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The

Nationalist government replied by stating that the initiative in the
affair came from Britain and France.
The Spanish statement of neutrality originated from the Nationalist's
misgivings over what effect the Munich conference would have on the
Nationalist's cause.

The Spaniards felt that during the conference

Germany did not give enough consideration to the cause of Nationalist
Spain.

Berlin in fact maintained no contact with Franco as to German
64
political or military intentions in the event of a European war.
Germany quickly reassured the Nationalists that no decision concerning
Spain came out of the talks between Hitler and Chamberlain and that Ger
man units and material would remain in Spain in the event of war.
German reassurances

calmed the Spanish and stimulated further attempt's

to solidify German-Spanish political relations.
The next German effort to strengthen German-Spanish political ties
was the attempt to secure Spanish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

, 749.

^^Ibid., 752.

^^Ibid., 741.
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On January k, 1939; the Foreign Ministry instructed Stohrer to discuss
65

the matter with Franco.
British

Because of the possibility of French and

jure recognition of the Nationalist's government at the time.

Franco politely rejected the German invitation.

He eventually agreed

at the end of February but on the condition that it remain a secret
until the end of the war.
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The Nationalists feared that a public

announcement would jeopardize its efforts to secure the return of
Loyalist war materials, merchant vessels, and gold from France.

On

April 7; 1939; after settlement with the French, the Nationalist govern
ment publically announced its March I7 adherence to the Anti-Comintern
Pact.^^
Although Germany was quite willing to apply pressure on the Franco
government in order to conclude political agreements, it maintained an
official policy of non-intervention in domestic Spanish affairs through
out the civil w ar. The Germans felt that their interests in Spain were
best served by not emphasizing their ideological inclination towards the
Spanish Falange.

Any attempts to transplant National Socialism to

Spain was potentially dangerous to future German-Spanish relations.
This policy was in operation as early as November 1936, when the Foreign
Ministry instructed Faupel, newly appointed ambassador to Nationalist
Spain, not to interfere with the Rebel conduct of the war or to assist

^^GFD., 8l4.

^^Esch., 158.
^'^Two other German-Spanish agreements were concluded during 1939;
a cultural agreement on January 2k, and a labor exchange permit agree
ment on January 2 9 . The ratification of the cultural agreement was
delayed by protests from the Vatican to the Nationalist government. The
matter was eventually allowed to lapse without ratification.
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General Franco unless requested to do so.^^
The success of the German efforts to assure closer political
relations with Nationalists Spain was clearly evident by the summer of
1939-

Although the Nationalists were committed by the Treaty of Friend

ship not to enter into agreements directed against Ge r m a n y t h e y were
not bound to any definite military or political alliance.

No treaty

or agreement existed between Spain and Germany that morgaged Spain’s
political future.

It was obvious from Franco's statements during the

Czech crisis that Spain would remain neutral during any future European
war.

To what extent this neutrality would be favorable towards Germany

was a questibn that only future events could decide.

However, German

political influence in Spain combined with its considerable economic
influence created a situation in which Germany controlled to a
considerable extent Spain's future political and economic foreign
relations.

This was evident during World War II when the predominant

German position in Spain forced the Nationalist government to balance its
foreign policy between neutrality, benevolent neutrality and outright
association with the Axis powers.

Being a military officer and staunch supporter of the Spanish
Falange, Faupel found it difficult to stay out of Spanish political
problems and to let the Rebels conduct the war. It was partly for these
reasons that Franco requested Faupels recall in September 1937-

CONCLUSION

After its initial decision in July 1936 to support the Spanish
Nationalists with military assistance, Germany continued throughout
the civil war to give the Nationalists diplomatic and military support.
Ey the summer of 1938, Germany calculated that its military assistance
to the Rebels totaled 337 million Reichsmarks.^

This figure did not

include the casualities among the German personnel in Spain nor the cost
to German prestige and influence caused by the international complications
of the German policy of publicly adhering to non-intervention while
privately sending military aid to the Spanish Nationalists.

The dis

patch of the Condor Legion to Spain in October 1936 caused additional
hardships on the German Luftwaffe which was in the process of an extensive
training program at home.

According to Kesselring, then Chief of the

General Staff of the Luftwaffe, "drafts to the Spanish theatre comprised
our very best material, to the prejudice of the training work of the
Home Command.

. . . We, at home, were accordingly faced with every kind

of difficulty as the demand for personnel and technical equipment upset
our training programme.
Although German intervention in Spain occurred simultaneously with
Italian intervention and eventually became a cooperative effort, impor
tant differences existed between the German and Italian contributions

^GFD., 648.
^Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Record, (New York, 1954), 22.
Hereafter cited as Kesselring.
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to the Rebel victory.

While Italian military aid to the Spanish

Nationalists was more extensive in quantity,

3

Germany contributed

military and technical aid far superior in quality.

German military

aid included large quantities of heavy equipment, heavy artillery,
trained artillerists, heavy bombers, pilots, navigators, anti-aircraft
crews, and in general the technical services necessary to wage modern
war.

At least as important was the swiftness of organization and dis

patch of the German aid to the Rebel forces.

During the months of July

and August 1936, it was Germany, rather than Italy, that supplied the
Rebels with sufficient material to overcome the vast and bitter resis
tance of the Spanish people and to ferry the Rebel troops across the
k
Straits of Gibraltar.

Hitler later commented that "the intervention

of the German General von Richthofen and the bombs his squadrons rained
from the heavens . . . decided the i s s u e . T o w a r d s the end of World
War II, Hitler stated that "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory
of the Junker 52.

It is this aircraft that the Spanish revolution has

to thank for its victory.

It was a piece of luck that our aircraft

were able to fly direct from Stuttgart to Spain.
Compensation from the Spanish Nationalist government for German
war materials was not as extensive as Germany expected.

men.

Although there

^By March 1937, Italian troops in Spain numbered 60 to 70 thousand
Bullock, 3^8-3^0^Puzzo, 65 -6 6 .
^Adolf Hitler, tr. R.H. Stevens, Hitler's Secret Conversations
Hereafter cited as Conversations.

19 4 1 -1 9 4 4 , (New York, 1953), 462,

^Conversations, 558.
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were various German-Spanish agreements, protocols and treaties out
lining in general terms future German participation in the Spanish
economy, no definite agreements existed between the two countries by
which the Rebels acknowledged a definite area of the Spanish economy
available for German exploitation.

This was true despite the 1939

mining concessions granted to the German controlled Solfindus company.^
As late as September 1940, Franco still proved to be obstinate over
the question of repayment of the civil war debt.

He refused to mix

what he considered idealistic questions (the Nationalist cause) with
crass economic questions (the Nationalist debt to Germany).
Despite the difficulties of acquiring economic concessions from
the Rebels and in bringing Nationalist Spain into closer political

8
relations with the Axis powers,

Germany did receive some benefits from

its intervention in the Spanish Civil War.

The Condor Legion gained

an immense amount of combat experience during the civil war.

The Ju 8T

dive bomber excelled to such an extent that it was used as a decisive
weapon in World War II until 194-2.

Also the activities of the German

anti-aircraft batteries in Spain gave German observers valuable
information as to the "tactical employment and development as organized
7
Throughout the civil war Nationalist Spain was shipping extensive
amounts of ores to Germany, but this was by separate agreements per
taining to each shipment of ore. This type of arrangement could be
terminated at the pleasure of the Rebels. Thus German ore supplies
from Spain were on tenuous grounds.
8
Although Spain signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, this was
not a formal agreement to support the cause of Fascism nor a binding
political agreement. It merely combined Germany-Italy-Spain in a
common cause against Communism.
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units of these batteries."^
A political advantage gained by Germany for its participation in
the civil war was that another Fascist or dictatorial state, along the
lines of Germany and Italy, established itself in Europe.

As far as

Germany was concerned, the more Fascist states in Europe, the greater
would be its prestige.

A Fascist government in Spain would not only

strengthen German influence in Europe but would also surround France
with unfriendly neighbors whose very existence might prevent effective
French action against German manipulations in Eastern Europe.
Perhaps an even greater advantage for Germany arose out of GermanItalian cooperation in aiding the Rebels during the civil war.

This

cooperation resulted in closer relations between Italy and Germany.

It

was Germany's policy as early as 1936 to court the Italians in an
effort to prevent them from succumbing to British and French attempts
to re-establish good relations with Italy after the Ethiopian affair.
Italian interest in the Spanish conflict further embittered ItalianBritish-French relations.

As a consequence, Italy gravitated towards

Germany which held similar interests in the Spanish situation.

Thus

Chamberlain's overtures to Mussolini from 1937 to 1939 did not spcceed
because of Italian policy in Spain.

Germany let Italy contribute the

majority of the aid to the Spanish Rebels and thereby create a cooling
of relations between Britain, France and Italy.
In November 1937, while Italy was becoming deeply committed to the

Kesselring, 22,

10

GFD., 170-173.
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Spanish cause. Hitler was telling his generals that a 100% Rebel victory
was not desirable since a continuation of tensions in the western Medit
erranean would lead to a further deterioration of British, French and

11
Italian relations.

This could only benefit Germany.

"Indeed, the

common policy of Italy and Germany towards Spain created one of the
main foundations on which the Rome-Berlin Axis was built, and the
Spanish Civil War proved much greater scope for such cooperation than
12
the Abyssinian War from which Germany had held aloof."
The Spanish Civil War provided Germany with one more occasion to
test the mettle of Britain and France as to how far they would allow
Germany to proceed with its adventuristic foreign policy.

German and

Italian intervention in Spain elicited only a feeble veto from the
Western powers and in some cases outright encouragement.

The British

and French attitude convinced Hitler that he could continue his
uncompromising attitude in foreign affairs without recourse to war.
By

1938, the Spanish Civil War slowly faded out of the inter

national picture to be replaced by more important and pressing matters
such as the Munich conference.

World attention was more concerned with

what Hitler was saying and doing than in what was going on in Spain.
On February 10, 19^5, Hitler commented for the last time on the Franco
regime.

"We were badly deceived, for, had I know the real state of

affairs, I would never have allowed our aircraft to bombard and destroy

^^GFD., Series D, Vol. I, 36-37<
^^Bullock, 348-350.
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a starving population and at the same time re-establish the Spanish
13
clergy in all their horrible privileges.

Hitler, at this time, was

attempting to rationalize Germany's impending defeat and was blaming
the Spanish Rebels for not entering the war on the Axis side.

As far

as Hitler was concerned, the Rebels obstinacy in refusing to join the
Axis during World War II was indicative of Spanish ingratitude for
German support during the civil war.

^^Adolf Hitler, tr. R.H. Stevens, The Testament of Adolf Hitler
(February-April 19^3)? (London, l$6l), 48.
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